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This paper calculates prospective pension entitlements for 
illustrative workers at different income levels in 15 OECD 
countries.  The modelling includes universal and 
resource-tested schemes, public and private earnings-related 
plans and mandatory defined contribution schemes.  The paper 
includes a detailed description of pension systems, gross 
pension benefits and benefits net of tax.  The results show 
considerable differences in the philosophy of different countries 
pension schemes, particularly in the importance of insurance 
and redistributive motives.   
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Pension systems in 15 countries compared: 
The value of entitlements 
 
 
Edward Whitehouse 
 
 
The main goal of retirement-income systems is to ensure that the elderly have the resources 
to support an adequate standard of living.  The most common method of measuring 
countries’ success in achieving this objective is to compare directly current pensioners’ 
incomes with general living standards.  There are many examples of this ‘empirical’ 
approach to looking at the effect of pension systems on the incomes of the elderly, 
although most form part of broader studies of the distribution of income.1  While this 
direct, empirical approach can be very informative, it is silent on a number of important 
questions.  First, it can be an ineffective way of assessing current pension systems.  Today’s 
pension outcomes depend as much on past rules of the pension system as they do on the 
current parameters.  These rules have changed significantly over time.  Moreover, some 
schemes have not yet matured and this will affect both levels of current pensioners’ 
incomes and the pattern of incomes with characteristics such as age and marital status.  
Secondly, current pension outcomes depend on people’s earnings, employment and 
contribution records.  Past macroeconomic conditions, again in constant flux, will also 
have affected pensioners’ incomes.  
 This paper adopts a second method, which might be called an ‘institutional’ 
approach.  It calculates prospective pension entitlements of illustrative workers with 
particular characteristics.  The model used here applies the pension system’s parameters — 
                                                 
1  See, for example, Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding (1995), Börsch-Supan (1997), Burniaux at al. 
(1998), Disney and Johnson (2001), Disney, Mira d’Ercole and Scherer (1998), Förster and Pellizzari (2000), 
Hauser (1997) and Johnson (1998).  These and other studies are surveyed in Disney and Whitehouse (2001) 
and Whitehouse (2000c).   
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such as accrual rates, minimum pensions, indexation rules, eligibility requirements etc. — to 
calculate pension benefits.  The results are typically expressed as replacement rates: the 
ratio of the pension benefit either to the individual’s earnings or to a measure of economy-
wide earnings.  Unlike empirical studies, therefore, the institutional approach can assess the 
impact of the rules of the current pension system on current workers.   
 Nevertheless, this institutional approach also has a number of potential problems.  
First, it assumes that the structure of the pension system and its parameters remain 
unchanged in the future.  But the frequency and the scale of past pension reforms suggest 
that future pension regimes will look very different from today’s systems.2  Secondly, it 
ignores the resources, other than pensions, on which the elderly can draw, such as 
investments and non-financial wealth, especially housing.  A third, related issue is the fact 
that many of the elderly live in larger households.  Individual-level replacement rates ignore 
the sharing of resources with other household members.   
 For these reasons, empirical analysis of income-distribution data and the 
forward-looking calculation of pension entitlements should be viewed as complementary 
parts of the assessment of retirement income systems  
 There have been a number of previous institutional studies that share this paper’s 
aim of calculating pension entitlements for illustrative workers.3  Some of these are out of 
date.  Some have ignored private pension benefits or treated them only cursorily.4 Some 
have ignored the effect of direct taxes and looked only at gross pension entitlements.  This 
understates pensioners’ relative incomes for a number of reasons.5  Pensioners often do 
not pay social-security contributions.  Personal income taxes are progressive: the average 
tax rate on (lower) pension income will be less than the tax rate on (higher) earned income.  
In addition, most income tax systems give preferential treatment to pensions (exempting 
some or all of income from tax) or to pensioners (giving additional allowances, credits or 
zero-rate bands to the elderly).  Replacement rates net of taxes and contributions are higher 
than gross figures.   
                                                 
2  McHale (1999) studies the impact of reforms on future pension entitlements in the G7 countries.  
Diamond (1997) argues that pension systems can be excessively responsive to short-term fiscal conditions 
(given the limited ability of the elderly to absorb these changes).  
3  Eurostat (1993), Aldrich (1982), Johnson (1998), Table 1.1 and McHale (1999). 
4  The values of private pension benefits are modelled using data on the rules of actual system rather 
than the illustrative target replacement rates employed in Eurostat (1993).  The latter also ignores the 
important issue of lack of portability of defined-benefit occupational pensions: see below.   
5  See Whiteford (1995) for a discussion of these issues.   
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 The following section of the paper discusses 15 industrialised countries in turn.  
Each section by sets out the key parameters of the pension system, discussing different 
components separately.  These components can include: 
• Flat-rate, universal, public benefits, here called basic pensions for short.   
• Resource-tested public benefits, where the benefit is withdrawn from richer pensioners.  
These can be means-tested, where both assets and income are taken into account, 
purely income-tested or withdrawn only against pension income.   
• Earnings-related public benefits (including the so-called ‘notional-accounts’ based 
schemes in Italy and Sweden).  These schemes pay a higher benefit to people whose 
earnings were higher during their working lives.   
• Employer-provided pensions, which are usually defined benefit (they pay a specific sum 
or proportion of earnings for each year of membership), called occupational pensions 
in this report.   
• Mandatory personal pensions (which have a defined contribution formula, so the 
pension benefit depends on contributions made and investment returns earned), 
known in the United States as ‘individual accounts’.   
As ever, there are many borderline cases.  Earnings-related pensions in Finland, the 
Netherlands and Sweden, for example, are ostensibly privately provided.  However, in 
Finland, these occupational pension schemes are statutory.  In the Netherlands and 
Sweden, collective bargaining has resulted in near universal coverage: these plans are best 
thought of as ‘quasi-mandatory’.  In contrast, employers provide occupational schemes 
voluntarily in Canada, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States.   
 The severance pay scheme in Korea provides lump sums to departing employees of 
any age.  It has been included because many individuals use these resources to support their 
old age.   
The personal defined contribution schemes included are the new superannuation 
guarantee in Australia, the new mandatory scheme in Sweden and personal pensions in the 
United Kingdom.  The latter are mandatory in the sense that people must make some 
provision for a second pension above the basic level, but this can be through either the 
public-sector scheme, an occupational scheme or a personal pension plan.  
 Sections 2 and 3 present the core empirical results: the value of pension benefits in 
the 15 countries.  The results are presented in a standard format and on standard 
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assumptions.  Pension benefits are calculated for a full-career worker earning various 
proportions of economy-wide average earnings, between 0.3 times and five times the 
average.  Although most workers, of course, lie in the bottom part of this scale, a broad 
range of earnings was chosen to illustrate properly the impact of ceilings on pensionable 
earnings.  People are assumed to retire at the standard pension age, which is typically 65 in 
these countries.   
The average earnings data are the pay of the average production worker, as set out 
in OECD (2000).  For reference, Table 1 shows these earnings levels in national currency 
and in United States dollars.  Earnings have been translated into dollars using OECD 
purchasing power parities, which calculate the cost of a common basket of goods in each 
country.  Market exchange rates, of course, fluctuate wildly, and can generate very 
misleading results.  Real earnings, both of the illustrative worker and the economy as a 
whole, are assumed to grow at two per cent a year.   
 
Table 1.  Earnings of the average production worker 
 National currency US dollars at PPP
Australia 39 800 30 600 
Canada 35 000 30 200 
Finland 140 600 23 300 
France 136 300 20 600 
Germany 59 500 29 600 
Italy 38 873 400 24 000 
Japan 4 203 500 25 800 
Korea 17 706 000 27 300 
Netherlands 57 500 27 800 
Norway 265 700 27 700 
Spain 2 416 400 18 500 
Sweden 215 500 22 400 
Switzerland 60 200 30 900 
United Kingdom 17 500 26 600 
United States 29 100 29 100 
Note: all values rounded to the nearest hundred.  Conversion to dollars uses OECD 
purchasing power parities 
Source: OECD (2000) 
 
 
 The model uses the current parameters of the system, including any future changes 
that have already been legislated.  Governments, of course, frequently reform pension 
systems.  People retiring today, for example, have spent their working lives in many 
different and changing regimes.  Their pension benefits can be calculated under many 
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different rules.  This is therefore an unrealistic assumption, but it is difficult to formulate a 
sensible alternative.   
Looking into the future, some countries adjust some parameters of their pension 
system in line with prices.  This can have radical effects on the long-term structure of the 
scheme.  The baseline results therefore assume that parameters will rise in the long term in 
line with earnings.  Where pension programmes are resource-tested, it is assumed that the 
individual has no sources of income other than the mandatory pension.   
Section 4 looks at voluntary private pensions in three countries: Canada, the United 
Kingdom and the United States.6  Section 5 extends the analysis in a number of ways.  
First, the main analysis assumes a single worker: this section looks at the treatment of 
married couples.  Secondly, the section examines the treatment of workers with less than a 
full career: what happens to people’s pension entitlements when they are out of work 
because they are either unemployed or caring for children or elderly relatives? Thirdly, the 
baseline assumption is that the worker is employed, but countries differ in their treatment 
of the self-employed.  Section 5 ends with an exploration of the issue of post-retirement 
indexation of pension benefits.  The baseline results provide only a snapshot picture of 
pension benefits at normal pension age, but the procedure for uprating benefits has 
substantial effects on the value of the lifetime stream of pension payments.  Section 6 
concludes.  
 
 
1. Country descriptions 
1.1 Australia 
 Australia’s mandatory pension system has two components: a means-tested age 
pension plus the superannuation guarantee, a compulsory contribution to a private pension 
plan.   
 
                                                 
6  As noted previously, occupational plans are considered alongside public schemes in Finland, the 
Netherlands and Sweden.  Data on the rules of schemes in Germany and Japan are unavailable, but 
occupational pensions are less important in these countries. 
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1.1.1 Age pension 
 The full age pension for a single person in 1999 was A$372 paid fortnightly, that is 
A$9,672 a year.  This was equivalent to a quarter of average earnings.  Married couples 
receive a joint pension of 42 per cent of average earnings.  The age pension is withdrawn 
once annual income from other sources exceeds a ‘free area’ of $2,652 for a single person 
(equivalent to 6.7 per cent of average earnings).  The withdrawal rate is 50 per cent.  There 
is also an assets test.  However, some 94 per cent of pensioners affected have their benefits 
reduced by the income rather than the assets test.  Around a third of pensioners have their 
benefit reduced by the means test, with the other two-thirds on the full age pension.   
The age pension is paid from age 65 for men.  Women’s pensionable age — 
currently 61 — will increase gradually to 65 from 2013.  The age pension’s value is 
increased in line with the higher of earnings or prices.   
 
1.1.2 Superannuation guarantee 
 This second element of the Australian mandatory pension regime was introduced in 
1992.  It consists of a mandatory employer contribution to a private pension plan, which 
can be an industry-wide fund or a scheme operated by financial-services companies on 
behalf of an employer.  The mandatory contribution rate will reach nine per cent in 2002.  
Workers earning less than A$5,400 a year (equivalent to about 14 per cent of average 
earnings) are not required to contribute, but can choose to do so.   
 The minimum age for withdrawing benefits is currently 55, but this will increase 
gradually to 60 by 2025.   
 Before the superannuation guarantee was introduced, around 50 per cent of 
employees participated in voluntary occupational pension plans with both defined benefit 
and defined contribution formulae.  Employers are able to put out of the superannuation 
guarantee if they can show that the benefits from their occupational plan are at least as 
good.   
 The calculation of the value of the benefits from the superannuation guarantee is 
complicated by the tax treatment of contributions, investment returns and benefits.  A 15 
per cent tax is levied on employer contributions to the fund.  Nominal investment earnings 
and real capital gains of the fund are taxed, again at 15 per cent.  Income streams deriving 
from the accumulated capital are taxed, but with a 15 per cent rebate.   
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 A second issue is the withdrawal of pension benefits.  Although there are some 
defined benefit occupational plans, most employees are members of defined contribution 
plans.  Members can take out the accumulated capital as a lump sum or some sort of 
income stream.  Currently, most benefits are taken as a lump sum and phased withdrawals 
are the most popular form of income stream.  For comparison with other countries (where 
defined benefit plans predominate), the capital from the superannuation guarantee is 
converted to a price-indexed annuity.  The annuity calculation is based on population life 
tables averaged across four OECD countries.7   
 
 
1.2 Canada 
 Canada’s public pension system is made of three components.  A universal, flat-rate 
pension, known as old-age security, can be topped up with an income-tested benefit, 
known as the guaranteed income supplement.  A tier of earnings-related benefits is known 
as the Canada Pension Plan/Québec Pension Plan.  The two plans offer broadly similar 
benefits.   
 
1.2.1 Basic pension 
The basic tier is subject to a residency test, with 1/40th of the maximum pension 
earned for each year of residence after age 18 up to a maximum of 40 years.  A minimum 
of ten years’ residency is required to receive any benefit.  The 1999 benefit level was 
C$411.23 a month — 14 per cent of average earnings — payable from age 65.  This 
pension is subject to a means test operated through the tax system (often described as a 
‘claw-back’).  Once income exceeds C$53,215 it is withdrawn at a 15-per-cent rate.  This 
ceiling is equivalent to just over 1½ times average earnings.  It is indexed to prices.   
 
1.2.2 Income-tested pension 
An income-tested supplement is available to low-income pensioners.  This gives a 
maximum pension, including the universal benefit, of C$899.95 (31 per cent of average 
                                                 
7  Canada, France, Sweden and the United States.  Data drawn from the Berkeley mortality database.  
This is a matter simply of metrics and is not intended to represent either people’s behaviour or the annuities 
on offer in the market.   
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earnings) for a single person and C$1,459.12 (50 per cent) for a couple.  The benefit is 
withdrawn against income other than the basic pension at a 50-per-cent rate.  Both the 
basic and means-tested components of the state pension are price indexed.   
 
1.2.3 Earnings-related pension 
 The second-tier, earnings-related pension targets a 25-per-cent replacement rate.  It 
is based on average lifetime salary, with earlier years’ pay revalued in line with 
economy-wide earnings.  A single year’s contribution is sufficient to generate an 
entitlement.  The averaging formula excludes the 15 per cent of years between age 18 and 
65 with the lowest earnings and any years spent caring for a child under age seven.  
Currently, virtually all retired men and 85 per cent of women qualify for some earnings-
related pension benefits.  The government expects the latter proportion to increase to 90 
per cent by 2050.  The maximum earnings-related pension is C$751.67 a month (26 per 
cent of average earnings).  People earning less than C$3,500 a year (10 per cent of average 
earnings) are not required to contribute.  There is a ceiling of C$37,4000 (107 per cent of 
average earnings) to both contributions and benefits, which is indexed to average earnings, 
while the contribution floor is frozen in nominal terms.  The value of the pension after 
retirement is uprated annually in line with prices.   
 
1.2.4 Private pensions 
 Over 40 per cent of the Canadian workforce are members of occupational pension 
schemes, known as retirement pension plans.  Around 45 per cent of this total are 
members of public sector schemes.  This gives a coverage rate in the private sector of 
around 30 per cent compared with nearly 100-per-cent coverage among public-sector 
employees.  There was a shift to defined-contribution schemes in the 1980s and 1990s in 
the private sector, but these plans still account for just 13 per cent of total members 
(including hybrid plans with defined-benefit and defined-contribution elements).  Over 60 
per cent of members are in final-salary defined-benefit schemes, with 10 per cent in 
schemes with an average-salary formula and 20 per cent in plans that provide a flat benefit 
for each year of membership.  Most schemes cover the entire workforce, but 20 per cent of 
members are in schemes reserved solely for members of trades unions.   
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Most occupational schemes —covering 90 per cent of members — are compulsory 
for people eligible to join.  Typically, eligibility is determined by years of service (to a legal 
maximum of two years).  Vesting rules vary by province, but are generally two years of 
membership or five years’ service.  Some also depend on age.  Pensions can be transferred 
to another occupational scheme or a personal plan when a worker changes jobs, or 
‘preserved’ in the old occupational scheme until an employee reaches pension age.   
 Pension age is generally 65, but a significant minority of public-sector members can 
claim their pension at 60.  The accrual rate in public sector schemes is nearly always two 
per cent of earnings for each year of service.  The earnings formula is usually based on the 
best five years.  In the private sector, two per cent is also the most common accrual rate, 
accounting for nearly half of members.  But almost a third have accrual rates between 1½ 
and two per cent and another 10 per cent between 1 and 1½ per cent per year of service.  
There has been a shift towards the norm of two-per-cent accrual, partly because this is the 
maximum allowed in the income-tax regulations.   
Most schemes are integrated with the public earnings-related scheme, giving a 
lower accrual rate (usually 1.3 to 1.5 per cent) on the slice of earnings up to the ceiling for 
the second-tier pension.  Lump-sum benefits are not permitted.   
In 1989, post-retirement indexation was automatic for 70 per cent of members of 
public-sector schemes, but only for 7.5 per cent in the private sector.  However, only 28 
per cent of public sector members were guaranteed full inflation uprating.  Most large 
schemes, however, provided for ad-hoc increases that generally compensate for about half of 
inflation.   
 
 
1.3 Finland 
 Finland has a two-tier pension system, including a basic state pension and a range 
of different earnings-related plans for different groups of workers.   
 
1.3.1 Basic pension 
The basic pension (known as the national pension) is a universal benefit, withdrawn 
against pension income from the earnings-related schemes.  It is payable from age 65.  The 
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parameters of the system differ from one municipality to another to reflect regional 
differences in the cost of living.  The basic benefit is between FM26,472 (19 per cent of 
average earnings) and FM31,500 a year (22 per cent of average earnings).8  If other pension 
income exceeds FM2,990 a year, then the basic pension is reduced by 50 per cent of the 
difference.  This threshold is equivalent to two per cent of economy-wide average earnings.  
No pension is payable once other pension income exceeds FM54,500 to FM64,560 — 39 
to 46 per cent of average earnings — depending on municipality and marital status.9   
Eligibility is determined by a residence test.  The full benefit is payable with 40 
years residence as an adult, with pro-rata adjustments for shorter periods of residence.10  The 
basic pension benefit and the parameters of the means test are uprated annually in line with 
prices.   
The basic pension is an individual entitlement.  Supplements that are payable in 
respect of spouses with no entitlement of their own are being phased out.   
 
1.3.2 Earnings-related pension 
A range of different second-tier schemes covers different groups in the labour 
market.  Table 2 shows membership of the different plans.  Until the early 1990s, public-
sector pensions were more generous than the private-sector schemes, but the rules in the 
two sectors were then aligned.   
 
                                                 
8  The modelling uses the maximum municipal benefit level. 
9  There remains a small basic element that is not means-tested.  This has been ignored because it is 
worth just FM63 a month in 2000 (0.5 per cent of average earnings) and will be abolished completely in 2001.   
10  Note that the elderly who have spent long periods of their working lives in other countries are 
entitled to general, means-tested social assistance.  This guarantees a minimum income of between FM23,508 
and FM24,564 a year (around 17 per cent of average earnings).  This is between 12 and 22 per cent below the 
means-tested pension.  Again, the different benefit levels apply in different regions.  Married couples are each 
entitled to 85 per cent of the value of the benefit for a single person.   
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Table 2.  Coverage of different earnings-related pension programmes 
in Finland 
Coverage Scheme Members 
(%) 
Private-sector employees   
Main scheme TEL 51.7 
Blue-collar workers in construction etc. LEL 3.8 
Household workers, low-earner, short-contract workers TaEL 1.2 
Sailors MEL 0.3 
   
Self-employed   
Farmers MYEL 5.4 
Other self-employed YEL 7.3 
   
Public-sector employees   
Central government VEL 8.7 
Local government KVTEL 20.9 
Church KiEL 0.7 
 
 
As with the basic pension, the earnings-related benefit is payable from age 65.  The 
benefit is 1.5 per cent of average pensionable pay for each year of employment between age 
23 and 59.  Between 60 and 64, a pension of 2.5 per cent of pay is earned for each year of 
coverage.  The system also covers people when they are not working, with an accrual rate 
of 1.2 per cent a year for each year on unemployment benefits.  There is a ceiling of 60 per 
cent to the total replacement rate, so someone covered continuously from age 23 will reach 
the maximum benefit at age 62.   
There is no contribution floor, and no ceiling either to contributions or to benefits.  
Pensionable pay is defined as gross earnings less employees’ pension contributions 
averaged over the last ten years of employment in a particular scheme, revalued in line with 
a mix of economy-wide earnings and prices.11  Years with exceptionally low earnings can be 
ignored.   
After retirement, the earnings-related pension is uprated using a formula of 20 per 
cent of earnings inflation and 80 per cent of price inflation.12  The Central Pension Security 
Institute co-ordinates the schemes, resulting in a single pension payment even for people 
who have joined different plans at different stages of their working lives.  About 85 per 
cent of workers in the private-sector are members of plans operated by insurance 
                                                 
11  The averaging period was four years until 1996.  The increase to ten years is being phased in 
gradually and will be implemented in full from 2005.   
12  Pensions drawn early (between 60 and 64) have a more generous indexation procedure: 50 per cent 
of earnings inflation and 50 per cent of price inflation.   
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companies.  Large employers — with a workforce of 300 or more — are permitted to set 
up their own pension funds.   
 
 
1.4 France 
 The pension system in France has two components: an earnings-related public 
pension and mandatory occupational schemes.   
 
1.4.1 Public pension 
 The state pension targets a replacement rate of 50 per cent after 40 years’ 
contributions.  Shorter contribution periods result in a proportionally reduced pension.  
There is a ceiling on eligible earnings, which in 1999 was FFr 173,640, equivalent to nearly 
125 per cent of average earnings.  There is a minimum pension, which was FFr 39,416 in 
1999, or 29 per cent of average earnings.   
 
1.4.2 Occupational pension 
 The modelling is based on the ARRCO scheme, which covers the majority of 
employees.  Different rules apply to ‘cadres’ and ‘non-cadres’.  The following applies to 
non-cadres.   
 ARRCO is a points based system.  Although actual contributions are higher, 
benefits are only earned on six per cent of earnings.  The ARRCO ceiling is three times 
that of the public pension scheme, that is FFr 550 920, or nearly 375 per cent of average 
earnings.  Each year, the value of contributions is divided by the cost of a pension point.  
At retirement, the accumulated number of points is converted into a pension benefit by 
multiplying by the value of a pension point.  The 1999 value of a point was FFr 6.62 and 
the cost, FFr 71.85.   
Over the past four years, the average increase in the cost of a point has been 3.4 
per cent and the average increase in its value, 1.2 per cent.  These are approximately the 
increase in earnings and prices respectively and this is the uprating procedure assumed in 
the modelling.   
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1.5 Germany 
 The German public pension system has a single tier, including both redistributive 
and insurance elements.  Coverage of occupational pensions is broad.   
 
1.5.1 Earnings-related pension 
The formula for the earnings-related pension is based on a system of points.  One 
point is awarded for a year’s contributions at the average earnings of contributors (up to 
the contribution ceiling).  Contributions are levied on earnings between DM630 and 
DM102,000 a year, equivalent to one and 171 per cent of average earnings respectively.13  
People in short-term employment (up to 50 working days a year) are exempted regardless 
of their earnings, but people who work 15 hours or more a week must contribute even if 
their earnings fall below the floor.  The ceiling also applies to the number of benefit points 
earned.  Average covered earnings were DM53,082 in 1999 and are forecast to be 
DM54,513 in 2000.  This is equivalent to 92 per cent of the earnings of the average 
production worker (the average earnings measure used in this paper).  Contributions paid 
on earnings of this level therefore earn a worker one pension point.   
The sum of points at pension age is multiplied by a ‘pension value’, which was 
DM47.65 in 1998-99.14  Low-income workers’ points can be increased by up to 1½ times 
to a maximum of 75 per cent of average earnings of contributors (i.e., 0.75 points) if they 
have contributed for 35 years.  The first three year’s contributions before the age of 25 are 
adjusted upwards to the lesser of 75 per cent of the individual’s total pension entitlement 
or 75 per cent of his or her lifetime average pay.  The pension is payable from age 65 with 
five years’ contributions and from age 63 with 35 years’.  (Fewer than five years’ 
contributions earn no benefit.)  The ‘pension value’ is uprated annually in line with net 
wages.  This indexation procedure affects both the post-retirement benefit and the 
pre-retirement revaluation of earnings in the benefit formula.   
 
                                                 
13  There is a lower floor of DM530 and ceiling of DM86,400 in the new Länder.   
14  There is currently a lower pension value in the new Länder of DM40.87. 
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1.5.2 Schemes for public-sector employees 
 Around 2½ million civil servants are not covered by the general state pension 
scheme.  The civil service pension plan pays 1.875 per cent of final salary for each year of 
service up to a maximum replacement rate of 75 per cent (i.e., after 40 years’ service).  No 
pension is paid for periods of service of less than five years.  The normal pension age is 65.  
There is a minimum pension set as a proportion of the earnings of a low-level public 
servant.  Pensions in payment are uprated in line with the gross civil service pay.  
 Other public-sector workers — around four million of them — remain in the 
general state pension scheme but are also entitled to supplementary pensions.   
 
1.5.3 Occupational pensions 
 Around a quarter of private-sector employees in Germany are covered by 
occupational pension schemes, although coverage has been declining in recent years.  They 
are mainly provided by larger employers.  There are four main types of scheme.   
 The predominant type of plan is book-reserve financed pensions.  Under this type 
of scheme, there is no independent pension fund, just a pension reserve shown as a liability 
on the firm’s balance sheet.  Pensions must, however, be insured through the mutual 
Pension Insurance Association.  Book reserve pensions account for more than half of 
members of occupational pension schemes.   
 The second most common type of provision is so-called ‘pension funds’, covering 
19 per cent of those with occupational pensions.  These are captive insurers, set up as 
mutual benefit associations.  
 The third type of occupational plan is an individual or group policy taken out by 
the employer on behalf of employees.  These schemes, known as direct insurance, account 
for 14 per cent of occupational pension membership.   
 The final method of providing occupational pensions is through ‘support funds’.  
These are legally separate institutions, established by a single employer or a consortium of 
firms.  They can be set up either as a limited company or a registered association.  Support 
funds are normally used in conjunction with other plan types to provide occupational 
pensions.  
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Book reserves and support funds are most common among larger employer: 
smaller firms tend to use pension funds or direct insurance.   
Pensionable age in occupational plans is aligned with that of the public scheme.  
More than half of schemes pay only a flat retirement benefit, regardless of the number of 
years of membership of the scheme (once onerous vesting conditions — ten years’ 
membership — have been met).  This rate can, however, vary with the employee’s grade.  
Higher grades tend to get a higher replacement rate to compensate for the ceiling in the 
public scheme.  More than a third of occupational plans pay a flat rate benefit depending 
on scheme tenure.  Only ten per cent of schemes are fully earnings-related.15  Around two-
thirds of schemes pay an annuity income stream with the remainder (predominantly smaller 
schemes) offering a lump sum alone.   
Occupational pensions are much less important in Germany than in Canada, the 
United Kingdom and the United States, for example.  Overall, they account for less than 
five per cent of pensioners’ incomes.  Given also the absence of detailed data on the rules 
of occupational schemes, they have not been modelled.   
 
1.5.4 Social assistance 
Although there is no specific minimum pension or means-tested pension in 
Germany, the elderly can claim the general safety-net benefit (known as ‘Sozialhilfe’, or 
social aid).  Almost half of social-assistance recipients are elderly.  The minimum income is 
DM625 a month for a single person and DM1,129 for a couple.  These are equivalent to 13 
and 23 per cent of average earnings respectively.   
 
 
1.6 Italy 
 The Italian pension system has undergone two major reforms in the 1990s with 
further change under discussion.  The parameters of the system adopted here are those 
applying to labour-market entrants after 1996.   
 
                                                 
15  These data refer to the old Länder in 1990.  Source: StaBA (1995).   
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1.6.1 Earnings-related pension 
The normal pension age under the new system will be 65 but it will be possible to 
draw the pension from age 57, subject to five years’ contributions being paid and to 
actuarial adjustments of the pension value (see below).  The new Italian system is similar to 
so-called ‘notional-accounts’ schemes, also recently introduced in Latvia, Poland and 
Sweden.16   
The pension benefit depends on the value of contributions paid.  Contributions are 
uprated in line with a five-year moving average of GDP growth until the year of retirement.  
The resulting ‘notional capital’ is then multiplied by a ‘transformation coefficient’, akin to 
the annuity rate in a true defined-contribution system.  This coefficient varies with the age 
at which the pension is claimed, from 4.72 at age 57 to 6.136 at age 65.   
The minimum pay for contribution purposes is L67,474 a day (41 per cent of 
average earnings) or the industry-specific minimum wage if higher.  Once this threshold is 
reached, contributions are paid on the whole of earnings, not just the excess over the floor.  
The maximum earnings for benefits are L141,991,000 a year, nearly 3.7 times average 
earnings.  This applies to labour-market entrants from 1999.  Employees’ contributions are 
8.89 per cent of earnings up to L65,280,000 a year (168 per cent of average earnings) and 
9.9 per cent thereafter.  The standard employers’ contribution rate is 23.81 per cent, but 
there are many lower rates applying to specific industries and regions.  However, 
individuals’ notional accounts in the new system will be credited for the moment with a 
higher ‘equilibrium’ contribution rate rather than actual contributions paid.17   
Pensions in payment are indexed to price inflation.  The calculation of the 
transformation coefficient includes an implicit real interest rate of 1.5 per cent.  The 
legislation allows the government to increase pensions in payment more rapidly than prices 
when GDP growth exceeds 1.5 per cent.   
 
1.6.2 Social assistance 
 The switch to the new notional accounts system led to the abolition of the previous 
minimum pension as part of the aim of linking benefits more closely to the contributions 
                                                 
16  See Disney (1999b).   
17  According to Hamann (1997), the actual contribution rate (employers’ plus employees’) was 32 per 
cent in 1995 compared with the 33 per cent credited.  The self-employed are credited with 20 per cent of 
their income compared with a contribution of just 15 per cent.   
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that have been made.  There remains, however, a social assistance benefit for the elderly 
(known as the ‘assegno sociale’ or social allowance).  The benefit is available to people over 
65.  It guarantees a minimum income of L6,593,600 per person (so couples receive double 
the amount of single people).  This minimum is equivalent to 17 per cent of average 
earnings for a single person.    
 
 
1.7 Japan 
 The Japanese public pension system is another two-tier regime.  There is also a 
substantial occupational-pension sector.   
 
1.7.1 Basic pension 
The basic pension is payable from age 60 with a minimum of 25 years’ 
contributions.  The pension age will be increased in future, to reach 65 for men in 2013 and 
for women in 2018.  Currently, 96 per cent of people of pension age receive some basic 
pension.  To receive a full pension, 40 years’ contributions are required.  Workers earning 
below the contribution floor of ¥92,000 a month are exempt.  This floor is equivalent to 
26 per cent of economy-wide average earnings.  Periods of exemption accrue pension at 
only one third the normal rate.  The full basic pension is ¥804,200 a year, 19 per cent of 
average earnings.  Average receipt is rather lower than this level: around ¥560,000 a year.  
The basic pension is price indexed.   
 
1.7.2 Earnings-related pension 
 The earnings-related pension, known as employees’ pension insurance, pays 0.75 
per cent of lifetime average earnings for each year of contributions.  The reform enacted in 
March 2000 will reduce this to 0.7125 per cent for each year of membership, a five-per-
cent cut in the accrual rate.  There is a ceiling on contributions and earnings eligible for 
benefits of ¥7,000,000 a year, or 168 per cent of average earnings.  Each year of coverage 
between age 60 and 64 adds an extra ¥1,625 a month.  Earlier years’ earnings are revalued 
in line with economy-wide average net earnings.  Benefits in payment in the 
earnings-related tiers will also be uprated in line with prices following the March 2000 
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reform.  Previously, they were indexed to net earnings.  The pension is payable from age 
60, but this will increase to 65 by 2025, a slower time scale than the increase in pension age 
for the basic benefit.   
 
1.7.3 Occupational pensions 
Some 90 per cent of employers also offer some kind of retirement package, but 
these differ substantially in the type of benefit provided.   
First, more than 70 per cent of employers offer a lump-sum retirement allowance, a 
benefit also used as a severance payment.  These are financed through book reserves.  
Payouts at pension age in 1997 averaged around ¥20 million, or 4.75 times economy-wide 
average earnings.   
Secondly, around 35 per cent of employees are members of tax-qualified pension 
plans, to which employer contributions are exempted from the corporate income tax.  
Most of these schemes allow the full benefit to be commuted into a lump sum and 
annuities are typically ten-year certain (i.e., payable for a ten-year term, even if the 
beneficiary dies during that period).  Only firms with 15 or more employees can establish a 
tax-qualified pension plan.  
Thirdly, about a fifth of employees are covered by an Employees’ Pension Fund.  
Contributions are typically 1.6 to 1.9 per cent each from both employees and employers.  
These funds are the only scheme allowed to contract out of the state system.  Pension 
funds can contract out if they pay a benefit at least 30 per cent larger than that which 
would have been received from the state earnings-related scheme.  In return, social security 
contributions are rebated at a rate that varies between 3.2 and 3.8 per cent, averaging 3.5 
per cent.18  Around half of Employees’ Pension Funds allow commutation of benefits into 
a lump sum.  The rules allow up to 90 per cent of the pension above the value that would 
have been received from the state earnings-related scheme to be taken as a lump sum.  
Benefits taken as an annuity are generally provided as a traditional life annuity.  Only 
employers with 500 or more employees are permitted to establish an Employees’ Pension 
Fund.  Employees can also contribute to these funds.  Around a third of employees 
contribute — mainly in larger firms — paying a third of the value of the employer 
                                                 
18  Note that the National Pension Fund pays for the revaluation of earlier years’ earnings and post-
retirement indexation of benefits for the people contracted out of this state scheme.  The government sets 
the size of the rebate, depending on the soundness of the fund’s finances.   
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contribution.  Employees leaving a plan with less than 20 years’ membership can take the 
accumulate entitlement as a lump sum.  This can then be transferred to the pension fund 
association, which acts as a kind of clearing house, investing the money until the member 
retires.  There is no provision for pension transfers into a new employer’s plan.  After 20 
years, the pension must be deferred (until the employee reaches retirement age).   
Finally, nearly 3 per cent of employees are members of occupational plans that are 
independent of the EPF system.  
Analysis of the system is complicated further by the fact that many employers offer 
more than one type of plan, as Table 3 shows.   
 
Table 3.  Coverage of different private pension arrangements in Japan 
Tax-qualified Employees’ Pension 
Fund 
Separate 
occupational scheme 
Proportion of 
employees 
x   24.5 
x x  10.0 
 x  9.5 
  x 1.5 
 x x 0.7 
x  x 0.4 
x x x 0.3 
 
 
 Nearly all of these schemes are defined benefit.  However, there has recently been 
strong growth in defined contribution plans.  These include Employees’ Property-
Accumulating Pension Plans and Smaller Employers Mutual Aid Plans.  Employers 
typically have a mandatory retirement age of 60, and pension benefits are paid from that 
age.  The 1999 pension reform introduces a new defined contribution plan that can be set 
up either as an individual or a company plan.  The latter is modelled on the 401(k) plan of 
the United States.19   
 
 
1.8 Korea 
 The Korean public pension scheme was introduced relatively recently.  Mandatory 
severance payments can also be viewed as a way of providing for retirement incomes.   
                                                 
19  See Takayama (2000a,b) for a detailed presentation.   
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1.8.1 Public pension 
 The scheme is earnings-related.  Benefits accrue at the rate of 1.5 per cent of 
earnings per year of membership.  The earnings measure used in the formula is the average 
of individual lifetime average earnings and economy-wide average pay.  This provision 
introduces an element of redistribution into the system.  There is, however, no ceiling to 
pensionable pay.   
 The pension is available from age 60 provided the individual has contributed for 
twenty years or more.  An actuarially reduced early pension can be drawn from age 55.  The 
benefit is indexed to prices after retirement.   
 
1.8.2 Severance pay 
 The mandatory severance payment is one months salary per year of service.  This is 
paid as a lump sum.  However, to compare the value of this benefit with other countries, 
the modelling converts this lump sum to an annuity using population life tables averaged 
across four OECD countries.   
 
 
1.9 Netherlands 
 The Netherlands has a two-tier pension system, consisting of a flat-rate public 
scheme and earnings-related occupational plans.  Although there is no statutory obligation 
for employers to offer a pension scheme to their employees, industrial-relations agreements 
mean that 91 per cent of employees are covered.  These schemes are therefore best thought 
of as quasi-mandatory.   
 
1.9.1 Basic pension 
 The public pension in the Netherlands is a flat-rate benefit, payable from age 65.  
The full benefit is payable with 50 years’ residence between age 15 and 64 and, if resident 
and earning, if contributions have been made.  The pension value is reduced for any gaps 
in residency or the contribution record.  People earning less than NLG8,617 a year (15 per 
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cent of average earnings) are exempted from contributions.  There is also a contribution 
ceiling of NLG56,792, just over twice average earnings.  The floor and ceiling are set equal 
to the thresholds of the first bracket of the income tax schedule.   
The pension benefit was NLG1684.70 a month for a single person and 
NLG2324.54 a month for a couple in 1998-99.  These benefit levels are equivalent to 35 
and 49 per cent of average earnings respectively.  The benefit value is uprated biannually in 
line with the net minimum wage.   
 
1.9.2 Occupational pensions 
 The Netherlands also has a private pension system with broad coverage.  The 
system consists of 64 industry-wide schemes, of which 95 per cent are defined benefit.  
Dutch companies are free to opt out of these plans if they offer their own scheme with 
equivalent benefits.  There are around 866 of these single-employer plans.  A further 
30,000 mainly smaller employers offer schemes operated by insurance companies on their 
behalf.   
The pension age in these schemes is 65, although people are ineligible to join until 
they reach age 25.  Most schemes give 1.75 per cent of final salary for each year of service, 
giving a replacement rate of 70 per cent after a complete 40-year career.  The law also 
allows for average-salary plans giving 2.25 per cent of average pay for each year of service.  
Three-quarters of plans are based on final salary; the rest are mainly average-salary 
schemes.   
Broad, industry-wide coverage of schemes reduces the problem of lack of 
portability.  Although there is no legal requirement to index pension rights of people 
leaving a scheme before retirement, most schemes offered full price indexation.  
Regulations now stipulate immediate vesting and transferability of pension rights between 
schemes: the new employer must assume the previous employer’s pension liability.  The 
portability regime is therefore similar to the system in the United Kingdom, discussed 
below.  Benefits in payment are also typically indexed to earnings, although there is no legal 
uprating requirement.   
Occupational pensions are integrated with the public pension system.  Tax rules 
allow a maximum benefit of 70 per cent of final pay from both public and private systems, 
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so private benefits are reduced by the value of the public pension entitlement, a process 
known as ‘franchising’.   
The franchise interacts in complex ways with the state pension.  A married man 
with a non-working wife would be assumed to receive nearly NLG27,900 from the public 
pension system (NLG2324 x 12).  At the earnings of the average production worker 
(NLG57,500), his total pension benefit would be capped at NLG40,250 or 70 per cent of 
pre-retirement pay.  The private pension benefit would be the difference between this cap 
and the public pension, NLG12,350.  A single person with the same level of earnings 
would get the same pension, but would get only NLG20,200 from the public scheme with 
a larger top up from the private plan.  A couple each earning half of the average production 
worker’s pay would both have their pension reduced by the married couple’s benefit.  Each 
would get 70 per cent of the difference between their earnings (NLG57,500/2 = 
NLG28,750) and the public pension, i.e., (NLG28,750 — NLG27,900) x 70% = NL600.  
The couple’s total pension would therefore be NLG29,100, giving a replacement of just 51 
per cent.   
 
 
1.10 Norway 
 The Norwegian public scheme has three components.  The first is a flat-rate, basic 
pension.  For workers with small overall pension entitlements, this can be topped up with a 
special supplement, providing a minimum pension guarantee.  Finally, there is an 
earnings-related scheme.  The pension age is 67.   
 
1.10.1 Basic pension 
 The full basic pension in 1999 was NKr 45,370, equivalent to 17 per cent of 
average earnings.  Forty years’ contributions are required to receive the full amount; the 
benefit is proportionally reduced for shorter contribution histories.   
 
1.10.2 Income-tested supplement 
 The special supplement is 79.3 per cent of the basic pension, giving a total 
minimum pension of around NKr 81,350, or just over 30 per cent of average earnings.   
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1.10.3 Earnings-related pension 
 Since the basic pension replaces the first slice of earnings, the earnings-related 
scheme only covers pay above the value of the basic pension (known as the base amount).  
The earnings-related scheme has a progressive formula.  Earnings between the base 
amount and six times the base amount are replaced as a 42 per cent rate.  Between six and 
12 times the base amount, the replacement rate is one third of that level (that is, 14 per 
cent).  Given that 40 years’ contributions are needed for a full pension, these are equivalent 
to annual accrual rates of 1.05 and 0.425 per cent respectively.  The first threshold, where 
the accrual rate declines, is a little over average earnings (102.5 per cent).  The ceiling on 
earnings eligible for benefits is therefore a little over double average earnings (205 per 
cent).   
 
 
1.11 Spain 
 The Spanish public pension system consist of a single, earnings-related benefit.  
The benefit accrues according to a schedule.  After 15 years’ contributions, it is 50 per cent 
of the earnings base.  Over the next 10 years, an extra three per cent is accrued per year, 
followed by two per cent per year thereafter.  The maximum accrual is 100 per cent, 
reached after 35 years’ contributions.  The earnings base is pay over the last 15 years, 
uprated in line with prices, apart from the last two years.  This means that the replacement 
rate relative to final salary is less than 100 per cent.  On the standard assumptions for 
earnings growth and price inflation, this is calculated to be 88 per cent.   
 
1.12 Sweden 
 The Swedish pension system has also recently undergone fundamental reform.  The 
new regime, introduced in 1999, applies to people aged 45 or under at the time of reform.  
Older workers — aged between 45 and 62 — will be covered proportionally by the old and 
the new systems.  The modelling covers only the new system, which has three tiers.   
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1.12.1 Earnings-related pension 
 The new earnings-related scheme, known as the income pension, is based on 
‘notional accounts’.20  Contributions of 16 per cent of pay will be credited to the notional 
account, and will then be uprated in line with a three-year moving average of economy-
wide earnings.21  Contributions are only levied when earnings exceed a floor of SKr8,952.  
There is a ceiling to benefits and employee contributions of SKr279,750, but there is no 
cap on employer contributions (even though pension rights do not accrue on earnings 
above the ceiling).22  There is provision for ‘imaginary’ contributions for periods of 
unemployment, sickness, education and caring responsibilities.  These are paid by the state 
rather than the employer on the basis of the value of the out-of-work benefit.  Some social 
security contributions can be levied on the benefit value with the state making the total up 
to 18.5 per cent.   
At retirement, the accumulated notional capital will be converted to an annuity.  
The calculation of the annuity coefficient will depend on individual retirement age and 
contemporaneous life expectancy (based on the previous five years’ unisex mortality table).  
It does not therefore aim to project the actual life expectancy of the cohort and so excludes 
any future mortality improvements.  A real return of 1.6 per cent a year will be assumed in 
this calculation.  Retirement will be possible from age 61.  Illustrative forecasts of the 
annuity coefficient at age 65 are 15.4 for 2000 rising to 15.9 by 2020.  This implies a 
pension of 6.5 per cent of accumulated notional capital, falling to 6.3 per cent in 2020.  The 
annuity coefficient is currently 18.2 for retirement at 61 and 13.0 if the pension claim is 
deferred to age 70.   
After retirement, pensions will be uprated in line with average earnings less a 
‘growth norm’ of 1.6 per cent.  So if real wage growth falls short of the norm, the real value 
of pensions will fall.  For example, assume inflation is 2.5 per cent and real wages grow by 
0.5 per cent.  The pension will be increased by 1.5 per cent, equivalent to a real cut of 
1 per cent.   
                                                 
20  Notional accounts are designed to mimic a defined contribution scheme, but are in fact nearly 
equivalent to a traditional pay-as-you-go defined benefit scheme.  For example, Scherman (1999), the director 
of the Swedish National Social Insurance Board points out: “The reality of the new Swedish system is that 
contributions, as the law is formulated, are set independently of pension entitlements just as in every PAYG 
defined benefit scheme…This law as such does not prevent an increase (or decrease) in contributions without 
affecting pension rights.”  See also Disney (1999b).   
21  The index includes average pensionable earnings (and so excludes pay over the ceiling).  It also 
includes the value of early retirement pensions.   
22  Note that the floor and ceiling are defined technically as 24 per cent and 7.5 times the base amount 
(of SKr37,300) respectively.   
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There is also a ‘balance mechanism’ to protect the system’s finances at times of 
pressure.  If total assets (the buffer fund plus contribution revenues) fall below total 
liabilities (pension benefits) then both the indexation of pensions in payments and the rate 
of return credited to the notional accounts of workers are reduced.   
 
1.12.2 Personal pensions  
A further 2.5 per cent of earnings will be paid into individual pension accounts, 
known as the premium pension.  People have a broad choice of where these funds are 
invested.  At retirement, a new public agency will be responsible for converting the 
accumulated balance into an annuity.  Alternatively, people will be able to choose a variable 
or ‘participating’ annuity, where their funds continue to be invested by their chosen fund 
manager.  These annuities do not have a guaranteed value but compensate for this risk with 
a higher expected rate of return.   
 
1.12.3 Income-tested pension 
 Low-paid workers will be protected by a ‘guarantee pension’.  This is essentially an 
income-tested top-up to people with low levels of notional-accounts benefit.  Eligibility for 
the guarantee pension will be earned with three years’ residency.  Maximum pension is 
earned with 40 years’ residency and is reduced proportionally for shorter periods of 
residency.  For a single person the guaranteed benefit is SKr77,958, or 36 per cent of 
average earnings.23  The guarantee pension is withdrawn at 100 per cent against the first 
SKr47,000 (21 per cent of average earnings) of income from the earnings-related pension, 
thereafter at 48 per cent.  Only when earnings-related pension income exceeds SKr114,500 
— or 51 per cent of average earnings — is entitlement to the guarantee exhausted.24  
Simulations suggest that around 40 per cent of the pensioner population will be eligible for 
the guarantee pension.25  The guarantee level will be price indexed, implying increased 
reliance on the earnings-related component over time.  General social assistance 
programmes protect people who do not meet the residency requirements for a guarantee 
pension.   
                                                 
23  Again, there is a general social assistance scheme that will protect the elderly who have spent most 
of their working lives in other countries.  The social assistance targets a much lower income level: less than 
half of the minimum pension.   
24  Note that the thresholds are defined formally as 1.26 and 3.07 times the base amount.   
25  Sundén (1999).   
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1.12.4 Occupational pensions 
 Sweden also has employer-provided pensions with broad coverage: the four major 
occupational schemes together cover 90 per cent of employees.  The four main schemes 
are:  
• a plan for private-sector, blue-collar workers (SAF-LO)26 
• a plan for private-sector, white-collar workers (ITP) 
• a plan for employees of the central government 
• a plan for employees of local government 
Pensions for blue-collar workers are managed by a mutual insurance organisation (AMF).  
They are defined benefit and partially funded.  White-collar workers’ pension can be 
provided through a similar mutual company (SPP).  Some employers make balance-sheet 
provisions through book reserves, accounting for 40 per cent of workers in the ITP 
programme.  In this case, another organisation (PRI) administers pensions in payment and 
provides actuarial estimates of future pension liabilities.  Finally, a small number of large 
companies have separate pension funds, along the lines of occupational schemes in the 
United Kingdom and United States.  While private-sector employers provide occupational 
schemes voluntarily, they are negotiated as part of collective agreements and so are 
probably best described as ‘quasi-mandatory’.  They are compulsory from the point of view 
of the employee, who must join a scheme if one is offered.  The public-sector plans, 
managed by local or central government bodies, are pay-as-you-go financed.  Table 4 
shows the division of occupational pension coverage, totalling 2.85 million in 1999, 
between the four main plans. 
 
                                                 
26  This new scheme was introduced in 1995 to replace the old STP programme.  New scheme entrants 
after 1995 (i.e., those aged 28 or under at that time) receive benefit only under the new scheme.  Transition 
provisions for existing STP members give a mix of benefits under the old and new regimes.   
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Table 4.  Occupational pension coverage 
in Sweden by scheme, 1999 
Type of worker Scheme Coverage 
(% of total) 
Blue-collar, private sector STP/SAF-LO 35 
White-collar, private sector ITP 21 
Central government — 9 
Local government — 35 
 
 
The standard pension age for occupational plans is 65, and there is a minimum 
entry age of 28.  
The new SAF-LO scheme for blue-collar workers, which replaced the defined 
benefit STP plan in 1995, is defined contribution.  Employers contribute two per cent of 
employees’ salaries to the mutual insurance organisation managing the scheme, up to the 
same ceiling as the state scheme (around 130 per cent of average earnings).  Total 
contributions, including those to pay for the old STP plan, averaged 3.15 per cent in 1996, 
although some employers pay as much as five per cent.  Workers can choose either to 
invest the money in a mutual fund of their choice or to opt for a guaranteed nominal 
return, typically three per cent.  They can switch funds once a year, either between the two 
investment options or between different mutual-fund providers.   
 The ITP scheme for white-collar workers has also been reformed recently.  In 
1999, the pension formula shifted from pure defined-benefit to a mix of defined benefit 
and defined contribution.  The defined benefit arm offers ten per cent of final salary on 
earnings up to the ceiling of the state pension system (around 130 per cent of average 
earnings).  Between this ceiling and a threshold of around 3.5 times average earnings, the 
pension pays 65 per cent of final salary.  From around 3.5 to 5.2 times average earnings, the 
accrual rate is 32.5 per cent, with no pension entitlement on earnings above 5.2 times 
economy-wide average pay.27  The ITP scheme therefore is a top-up to the state pension, 
paying much larger benefits to higher- than to lower-paid workers.  A full pension is earned 
with 30 years’ contributions between the ages of 28 and 65.  Shorter tenures result in a 
proportionally reduced pension.  The normal pension age is 65, but actuarially reduced 
benefits are available from age 62.   
                                                 
27  These thresholds are again formally defined in terms of the base amount: 7.5, 20 and 30 times the 
base amount respectively.   
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White-collar workers earning above the state-pension contribution ceiling can opt 
out of the main, defined-benefit ITP scheme.  Instead, they take out a defined contribution 
plan with a financial-services company, and their employer continues to contribute.   
 Finally, ITP members also have a supplementary, defined contribution plan.  As in 
the SAF-LO, workers can choose between a guaranteed nominal return on contributions 
(again typically three per cent a year) or to invest the contribution in a mutual fund of their 
choice.  There are similar restrictions on switching.   
 The public-sector schemes cover all full-time workers and part-timers that work 40 
per cent or more of the full working week.  The pension plan for central-government 
employees has the same accrual structure as the ITP plan, paying ten per cent of final salary 
below the ceiling for the state pension, and a higher replacement rate for higher earnings.  
‘Final’ salary is defined as the average of the last five years before retirement.  Although the 
normal pension age is typically 65, 30 years’ contributions between age 28 and 65 are 
sufficient for a full pension.  Workers can retire on a full pension from age 60 if they meet 
the contribution condition.  The benefit is reduced proportionally for less than full 
contribution records.  Although public plans are pay-as-you-go financed, ‘notional’ 
contributions of around six per cent of earnings are levied.  In addition, there is a defined 
contribution top-up pension, to which the government contributes 1.7 per cent of pay.   
There has been a marked shift from defined benefit to defined contribution 
formulae in Sweden’s occupational pension schemes.  In the main, these are designed as 
top-up schemes to the state pension and are mainly targeted at high-paid workers.  
Currently, they account for ten per cent of pensioners’ incomes.  Pensions are portable 
between employers within a particular programme and between the four main schemes.   
 
 
1.13 Switzerland 
 The Swiss mandatory pension system has two tiers.  The first is a public scheme 
which, although earnings-related, has a progressive formula.  The second is a system of 
mandatory occupational pensions.  There is also an income-tested supplementary benefit.   
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1.13.1 Public pension 
 The public pension is based on average lifetime earnings.  If this figure is less than 
SFr 36,180, then the entitlement is SFr 8,926 plus 26 per cent of average lifetime earnings.  
For lifetime earnings above the threshold, the entitlement is a flat SFr 12,542 plus 16 per 
cent of average lifetime earnings.  There is a minimum pension of SFr 12,060 and a 
maximum pension of twice that level.  These are equivalent to 20 and 40 per cent of 
average earnings respectively.  The maximum benefit is reached when earnings are 
SFr 72,360, equivalent to 120 per cent of economy-wide average earnings.  Pensionable age 
is currently 65 for men and 62 for women, although the latter will increase to 64 by 2005.   
 
1.13.2 Occupational pensions 
 The system of mandatory occupational pensions was introduced in 1985.  The 
system is built around defined credits to an individual’s pension account.28  These vary by 
sex and age, as shown in Table 5.  When a man reaches 65 after a full career in the system, 
he will have accumulated a sum of credits of 500 per cent of earnings.  The system has a 
minimum annuity rate of 7.2 per cent that is applied to this notional capital sum, giving a 
replacement rate of (500 x 7.2 = ) 36 per cent.   
 
Table 5.  Credits to individual pension accounts by age, Switzerland 
(per cent of ‘co-ordinated’ earnings) 
Age Annual 
Men Women credit 
25-34 25-31 7 
35-44 32-41 10 
45-54 42-51 15 
55-64 52-61 18 
Source: Federal Office of Social Insurance 
 
 
 The defined credits (and hence the replacement rate) apply only to ‘co-ordinated’ 
earnings.  This is pay between the maximum pension of the public scheme (SFr 24, 120) 
and three times that level (SFr 72,360).  These thresholds are equivalent to 40 and 120 per 
cent of average earnings.  Note that the ceiling for pensionable pay is the same in the 
                                                 
28  Many, if nor most, employees are in plans that offer benefits above this mandatory level.  However, 
the modelling focuses only on mandatory benefits.   
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public scheme and in the mandatory occupational pension sector.  The age of entitlement 
is also the same as the public scheme.   
 
1.13.3 Income-tested benefit 
 The supplementary benefit scheme aims to give a minimum pension income to 
single people of at least SFr 16,460, equivalent to 27 per cent of average earnings.   
 
1.14 United Kingdom 
 The United Kingdom has a complex pension system, which mixes defined benefit 
and defined contribution formulae and public and private provision.  The public scheme 
has two tiers, but most workers ‘contract out’ of its second tier into private pensions.   
 
1.14.1 Basic pension 
The first tier of the system is the basic state pension, worth £66.75 in 1999-00.  
This is a flat-rate benefit, payable to all people of pensionable age who meet the 
contribution condition.  There is a dependants’ supplement of £39.95 a week payable when 
one partner has no basic pension entitlement of their own.  The single person’s pension is 
worth 20 per cent of average earnings; the couple’s pension 32 per cent.  Pension age, 
currently 60 for women and 65 for men, will be equalised at 65 from 2010.  The 
simulations here assume the medium-term pension age of 65 for both sexes.  People need 
to have paid social security contributions for around nine-tenths of their potential working 
lives (44 years).  However, the apparent severity of this test is reduced by credits for 
periods in education and in receipt of certain social security benefits for unemployment or 
disability.  For people out of the labour market caring for children or sick relatives, home 
responsibilities protection, introduced in 1978, reduces the number of years of 
contributions needed to get the full pension.  People with an incomplete contribution 
record can claim a proportionally reduced pension, subject to a minimum of a quarter of 
the full pension level.  The Government Actuary (1995) assumes that these and other 
provisions will increase the proportion of women with their own entitlement to the basic 
pension from 70 per cent in 1995-96 to 100 per cent from 2010-11 onwards.  The average 
rate of benefit paid is expected to increase from 73 per cent of the standard rate in 1995-96 
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to 83 per cent in 2010-11 and 91 per cent in 2020-21.  The basic pension has been uprated 
annually in line with prices since 1981.   
 
1.14.2 Earnings-related pension 
 The second tier of the system offers individuals a choice of provision.  The state 
earnings-related pension scheme, known by its acronym Serps, pays a defined benefit 
pension.  Note that a reformed version of the Serps scheme, to be renamed the state 
second pension, will shortly be introduced.  However, the government has left open the 
long-run structure of the new scheme, which is likely to move towards a flat-rate formula.  
The new scheme will, in its early stages, increase the accrual rate for low earners.  But 
without detailed, long-term parameters, the modelling looks only at the old Serps scheme.29   
The 1988 pension reform reduced the target replacement rate under Serps from 25 
to 20 per cent.  This will be fully effective from 2010-11.  The scheme also accelerated 
accruals for earlier cohorts, so that a full pension could be earned after just 20 years.  From 
2027-28, all new retirees will have spent a full working life in the scheme, and the accrual 
rate will be 20/49 or 0.41 per cent for each year of membership.  Serps is calculated on 
average lifetime salary, with earlier years’ pay uprated in line with average economy-wide 
earnings.  The benefit is then price-indexed after retirement.  Serps benefits are earned only 
on ‘band earnings’ between the lower and upper earnings limits of the social security 
system.  In 1998-99, the floor was £66 a week and the ceiling £500 a week (20 and nearly 
150 per cent of average earnings respectively).  This gives a maximum pension of a little 
over 25 per cent of economy-wide average earnings in the long-term.  The contribution 
floor is also the minimum contribution level to receive the basic pension.  The earnings 
limits are uprated annually in line with the increase in the basic pension.  Since 1981, 
therefore, they have been price indexed.   
 
1.14.3 Occupational pensions 
Most people, however, are contracted out of Serps, into either an occupational 
plan, provided by an employer, or a personal pension, bought from a financial-services 
company, as indicated in Table 6.  Occupational schemes are mainly defined benefit, but 
there has been rapid growth since the mid-1980s in defined contribution occupational 
                                                 
29  See Agulnik (2000) and Disney, Emmerson and Tanner (1999) for a discussion of the reform.   
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plans, albeit from a very low base.30  Regulatory changes mean that many employers now 
prefer to offer their employees a group personal pension rather than a defined contribution 
occupational plan.  The aggregate value of employer contributions to personal pensions in 
their employees’ behalf grew two-and-a-half fold between 1994-95 and 1998-99.   
Both employers and employees pay a lower rate of social security contributions 
when contracted out and the employee foregoes their Serps entitlement.  In return, defined 
benefit schemes must guarantee a minimum pension and defined contribution plans must 
levy a minimum contribution.   
 
Table 6.  Second-tier pension provision in 
the United Kingdom, 1995-96 
 per cent of  
total coverage 
Defined benefit occupational  
Private sector 19 
Public sector 18 
  
Serps 35 
  
Defined contribution  
Private-sector occupational 1 
Personal pension 
(including group schemes) 
25 
Note: Occupational schemes refer only to those contracted out of Serps.  Around 1 per cent 
has a contracted in defined contribution occupational plan on top of Serps and 2 per cent are 
members of a contracted in defined benefit occupational plan 
Source: Department of Social Security (1998b) 
 
 
 Defined benefit occupational pension schemes provide a pension usually related to 
years of membership of the scheme and some measure of final salary when covered by the 
plan.31  Most public-sector schemes pay 1/80th of earnings per year of membership, plus 
3/80ths as a lump sum.  So the benefit after a full 40-year career would be half of final salary 
as an annuity plus 1½ times final salary as a lump sum.  Private-sector schemes are more 
diverse.  Around 60 per cent pay 1/60ths of final salary.  But taking a lump sum (known as 
commutation) reduces the annuity value.  Around a fifth are more generous than this while 
around 7 per cent pay less than 1/60ths or 1/80ths plus a lump sum.  More than a quarter of 
private occupational schemes are ‘integrated’ with the state scheme, reducing benefits to 
                                                 
30  See Disney (1995) for a discussion.   
31  Data in this section are taken from the National Association of Pension Funds annual survey.  See 
also Disney and Whitehouse (1994, 1996) and Government Actuary (1996). 
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take account of state pensions received.  Most cut the pension by the value of the basic 
state pension or the lower earnings limit (which are broadly similar by law).  Other 
methods of adjustment are more complicated.  For someone on average earnings in a 
1/60ths scheme, integration will typically reduce a full-career pension by around a fifth.  The 
defined benefit pension modelled pays 1/80ths — the minimum required to contract out of 
Serps — but is not integrated with the state pension.32  Benefits after retirement must be 
limited price indexed to a ceiling of five per cent.  However, all public-sector and many 
private-sector plans are fully price indexed.   
 
1.14.4 Personal pensions 
 The government introduced in 1988 the option of contracting out of Serps into a 
personal pension, open to occupational schemes since the advent of the scheme.  Table 6 
shows that a quarter of employees now has a personal pension.  Personal pensions are 
individual retirement-savings accounts, mainly sold by life insurance companies and banks.  
In return for foregoing their Serps entitlement, people pay a lower rate of social security 
contribution.  But this contribution rebate must be invested into the personal pension 
scheme.  The pension is defined contribution: the ultimate value depends on contributions 
made, the investment returns earned and the level of annuity rates when the member 
retires.   
 The government sets the social security rebate, usually every five years, on the 
advice of the Government Actuary.  The rebate is designed as fair compensation for the 
loss of Serps rights.  The Government Actuary calculates the value of Serps and, with 
assumptions about investment returns and administrative costs, the contribution to a 
personal pension that should deliver the same level of pension benefit.  The rebate has 
varied with age since April 1996.  As the Government Actuary’s assumptions are 
reasonable, the value of a personal pension should be equivalent to the Serps benefit 
foregone.  A model of mandatory personal-pension benefits, therefore, produces the same 
results as a model of Serps.33  Around 45 per cent of personal pension members contribute 
only the mandatory minimum to their plan.   
                                                 
32  Disney and Whitehouse (1994, 1996) model defined benefit pension values in a range of illustrative 
schemes with different benefit formulae.   
33  When the scheme was introduced, this was true on average.  But because of the effect of compound 
interest and Serps reforms which affected different cohorts’ benefits in different ways, younger workers were 
over-compensated and older workers under-compensated for contracting out.  This had a powerful adverse 
selection effect — only younger workers contracted out — with a significantly negative effect on the public 
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1.15 United States 
 The United States has a publicly provided pension benefit with a progressive 
formula, and different types of occupational scheme with broad coverage.   
 
1.15.1 Public pension 
 The public pension in the United States is payable from age 65.  The benefit is 
based on covered earnings between age 21 and age 62.  Earlier years’ earnings are revalued 
in line with economy-wide average earnings.  The five years with the lowest earnings are 
excluded from the average.  The ceiling for both contributions and benefits is $72,600 a 
year — 2½ times average earnings — uprated annually in line with economy-wide earnings.  
The benefit formula is progressive.  The first $531 a month of average revalued earnings 
attracts a 90 per cent replacement rate.  The band of earnings between $531 and $3,202 a 
month is replaced at 32 per cent.  These thresholds are 37 and 220 per cent of average 
earnings respectively.  A replacement rate of 15 per cent applies between the latter 
threshold and the earnings ceiling.  A 50-per-cent dependants’ addition is available to 
married couples where secondary earners have built up a smaller entitlement.   
 
1.15.2 Social assistance 
 The United States provide a means-tested benefit for the elderly34 known as 
Supplemental Security Income.  Single people over the age of 65 can be eligible for up to 
$6,144 a year depending on assets and other income.  The benefit rate for couples is $9,228 
(50 per cent higher than the rate for singles).  These are equivalent to around 21 and 32 per 
cent of average earnings respectively.   
 The asset tests are strict: single people are limited to $2,000 worth of assets and 
couples to $3,000, excluding personal belongings, a home, a car, funeral insurance and life 
insurance (the last two up to $1,500 value).  There is a small ($20 a month) ‘disregard’ in 
                                                                                                                                               
finances.  This is no longer the case, now that the rebate is age-related.  See Disney and Whitehouse (1992a,b) 
and Whitehouse (1998) for a detailed explanation.  
34  Disabled people of working age are also covered by this scheme.   
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calculating the entitlement.  The benefit is then withdrawn at a 100 per cent rate against 
income above this level.   
 The modelling and analysis of these benefits is complicated by the fact that states35 
can supplement the federally determined minimum.  Twelve states pay only the federal 
minimum. 36  Some 28 states administer their own system while 12 offer supplements that 
are operated by the federal Social Security Administration.  The average additional payment 
in these 12 states is 13 per cent for single pensioners and 18 per cent for couples (Table 7).   
 
Table 7.  State-level maximum supplements 
to Supplemental Security Income 
 Supplement, per cent of 
Federal minimum 
 Single Couple 
California 35 60 
Delaware 27 58 
Hawaii 1 1 
Massachusetts 25 26 
Nevada 7 10 
New Jersey 6 3 
New York 17 14 
Pennsylvania 5 6 
Rhode I 13 16 
Utah 0 1 
Vermont 11 14 
Washington 5 3 
Note: Washington has two separate regional regimes: the higher supplement is shown.  
Delaware’s and Montana’s supplements apply only to people in care 
Source: Social Security Administration (2000b) 
 
 
1.15.3 Occupational pensions 
 The majority of occupational pension schemes in the United States are final-salary 
defined benefit schemes.  These cover 56 per cent of occupational pension members, with 
23 per cent in flat-rate defined benefit plans (which pay a fixed amount for each month of 
                                                 
35  Using the term ‘state’ to include the 50 states as formally defined plus the Federal District of 
Columbia and the North Mariana Islands.   
36  Note that four of these offer supplements to the disabled but not to elderly beneficiaries.   
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coverage), 11 per cent in average-salary schemes and six per cent in defined contribution 
plans.37   
The definition of ‘final salary’ varies, but the most common formula is the best 
consecutive five years’ earnings, accounting for 65 per cent of members.  Accrual structures 
are complex, with only 37 per cent in schemes having a single accrual rate, the most 
common being between 1.25 and 1.75 per cent.  In 41 per cent of schemes, the accrual rate 
varies with the level of earnings and in another eight per cent, with the number of years of 
service.  Around half of plans are integrated with social security, usually by using an ‘excess 
formula’ that applies a lower accrual rate to earnings covered by social security.  The most 
common normal pension age is 65, although a number of plans only allow retirement once 
a minimum service level has been achieved.   
Following a series of regulatory changes, nearly a third of schemes now have no 
minimum age or service requirement for eligibility to join the plan.  Another third have a 
minimum service requirement of one year or less and a final third have a minimum entry 
age of 21 and a one-year’s-service requirement.  Schemes are voluntary, but participation 
rates are high, averaging nearly 80 per cent of full-time employees.  Vesting is now most 
commonly achieved with five year’s membership: these schemes account for 85 per cent of 
members.   
Post-retirement indexation of benefits is rare: just 3 per cent of members are 
promised automatic cost-of-living increases and only 4 per cent of schemes have granted 
discretionary increases in the last five years.  Fewer than one in four schemes allow any of 
the pension to be taken as a lump sum.   
 
 
2. Empirical results: gross pension benefits 
 The main results of the model of pension benefits in the 15 countries are set out in 
a series of charts and tables.  The underlying assumptions were set out in the introduction.  
To recap briefly, the models assume a full-career worker retiring at the normal pensionable 
                                                 
37  These data are taken from Mitchell (2000).  Note that the Department of Labor (1999) reports that 
defined benefit schemes cover only 49 per cent of members of occupational plans, with 51 per cent in 
defined contribution schemes alone and 32 per cent in both a defined benefit and a defined contribution 
plan.  Note that 401(k)s are not counted as occupational schemes.   
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age under the parameters of today’s pension system (including the full effect of any 
reforms legislated).   
The first set of charts, Figure 1, shows the value of pension benefits as a 
proportion of economy-wide average earnings.  These are presented for people earning 
various levels of the economy-wide average, ranging from 0.3 to five times the average.  
(The relatively high upper figure was chosen to exceed the benefit ceilings in all countries.  
Most workers will of course lie well to the left of the charts.)  The charts are to the same 
scale with the exceptions of Finland, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden.  The absence of a 
benefit ceiling to mandatory earnings-related means that pension entitlements for 
higher-income workers are larger than in the other countries.  It is important to be aware of 
these differences in the vertical scale when making cross-country comparisons.   
 The second set of charts, Figure 2, shows the value of pension benefits as a 
‘replacement rate’, that is, as a proportion of the individual’s pre-retirement earnings.  Here, 
the vertical scales have all been capped at 100 per cent: in some countries, benefits for 
low-income workers can exceed pre-retirement earnings.   
The two measures presented in Figures 1 and 2 respectively are complementary: 
they reveal different features of the structure of pension benefits.  Summary tables give the 
value of total pension benefits at selected levels of earnings.  Again, these are shown 
relative to economy-wide average earnings and to individual pre-retirement pay.   
The means test for the age pension in Australia begins when other income exceeds 
a relatively low ‘free area’ equivalent to seven per cent of economy-wide average earnings.  
The age pension is withdrawn at 50 per cent against the additional income from the 
superannuation guarantee.  When the age pension is exhausted, all income derives from the 
superannuation guarantee, giving a straight ray through the origin for the pension value in 
Figure 1 and a horizontal line in Figure 2.  The result is a very progressive, targeted pension 
system, as evidenced by the high pension replacement rates afforded to low-income 
workers.  
 In Canada, the basic pension is paid at a flat rate, but withdrawn once earnings 
reach a particular threshold.  The earnings-related pension naturally increases with earnings, 
but is flat once pay reaches the benefit ceiling, just over economy-wide average earnings.  
The income-tested component is withdrawn at a lower income level than the basic scheme.  
However, in the absence of any private pension or investment income (a rather implausible 
assumption), it is still payable to higher earners.  Adding the components together 
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produces an interesting pattern.  The value of the total pension at first increases with pay 
because of the earnings-related pension.  Once the pay threshold for the earnings-related 
scheme is reached, the pension value reaches a plateau.  Then the withdrawal of the basic 
pension kicks in.  Once the basic pension is exhausted, the overall pension is flat, worth 30 
per cent of economy-wide average earnings.   
 Looking at the pension value as a replacement rate (Figure 2), the means-tested and 
basic pensions together produce a rapidly declining replacement rate as earnings increase.  
The earnings-related pension offers a flat, 25-per-cent replacement rate at first, but the 
replacement rate declines once the earnings threshold is reached.  Adding the components 
together, the Canadian public-pension system is highly progressive, paying much higher 
replacement rates to low-income than to high-income workers.  Indeed, replacement rates 
for the highest-income workers are below ten per cent.  Overall, the curve is very close to a 
rectangular hyperbola, reflecting the fact that the system as a whole pays a broadly constant 
benefit at different earnings levels.   
In Finland, the income-tested pension is exhausted at three-quarters of average 
earnings and only earnings-related pension benefits are received above that level of 
earnings.  This means that the picture is much simpler than Canada, for example.  The 
absence of a ceiling to pension benefits and pensionable earnings means that the value of 
the pension continues to grow across the earnings range.  The contrast with the Canadian 
system is also clear from the individual replacement rates.  The income-tested pension 
boosts the replacement rate at lower level of earnings, but above the threshold of 
three-quarters of average pay, benefits are flat at 60 per cent of individual earnings.  The 
overall benefit structure is progressive because of the additional income-tested pension 
paid to people with the lowest incomes.   
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Figure 1.  Mandatory pension benefits as a proportion of economy-wide 
average earnings by individual earnings, 15 countries 
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 With a single pillar, the public pension in Germany is somewhat simpler to model 
than two-tier public systems, such as those in Canada and Finland.  Nevertheless, the boost 
to pensionable pay of the lowest workers in the benefit formula gives the public pension a 
progressive formula.  Up to half of average earnings, pensionable pay is increased to 1½ 
times its actual level.  However, beyond this threshold there is a plateau, because the rules 
prohibit an increase in pensionable pay beyond three-quarters of the average.  Unlike the 
46 
Finnish system, the German scheme has a ceiling to pensionable earnings, which means 
that the value of the pension is flat once earnings reach around one-and-three-quarter times 
the economy-wide average.  Note that the pension entitlement at 30 per cent of average 
earnings is sufficient to preclude entitlement to social assistance.  The addition to 
pensionable pay for lower-income workers results in a higher replacement rate against 
individual earnings (Figure 2).  The curve flattens out once earnings reach three-quarters of 
the average and the individual is longer entitled to this supplement.  The replacement rate 
then declines once earnings exceed the benefit ceiling.   
The pension values shown here are below those typically reported in national 
studies of Germany.  This is because of the treatment of pre-retirement indexation of 
earnings in the defined benefit formula.  In most other countries, earlier years’ earnings are 
uprated in line with economy-wide gross pay.  In Germany, this indexation is effectively to 
net wages.  Since contribution rates for the pension scheme are forecast to rise substantially 
in the future, the modelling assumes that net wages grow at 1.5 per cent a year, slower than 
the two per cent a year growth assumed for gross earnings.  The overall effect is that 
replacement rates are around 85 per cent of the value that they would be with indexation to 
gross earnings.   
 As in Germany, the new public pension system in Italy has just a single tier.  
Pension benefits at lower earnings are zero, because of the relatively high minimum applied 
both to contributions and benefits.  Then there is a jump, because contributions are levied 
and benefits are paid in respect of the whole of earnings once pay reaches the threshold.  
At the other end of the salary scale, the pension ceiling — at 365 per cent of economy-
wide average earnings — is also higher than limits in other countries.  Indeed, the pattern 
of pension level with earnings is much closer to systems without ceilings — Finland, the 
Netherlands and Sweden — than it is to other countries with benefit limits.  The relatively 
high floor to pension contributions means that the very lowest earners considered on the 
chart depend on social assistance for their income.  The social assistance level is, however, 
below the pension that would be earned for a full career of contributions at the 
contribution floor.  This results in a jump in the value of total benefits at the floor.   
The pattern of the individual replacement rate against earnings is also rather 
different from other countries.  There is a zero replacement rate from the public pension at 
the lowest levels of earnings.  However, social assistance ensures a minimum total benefit 
for the lowest income groups.  Since this is set at an absolute level, the replacement rate 
declines until the contribution floor of the notional-accounts system is reached.  The 
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relatively high earnings ceiling also means high replacement rates at higher levels of pay.  
The strengthening of the relationship between contributions and benefits in the new 
notional accounts scheme results in a less progressive structure of benefits than in 
countries with large basic, flat-rate or means-tested public programmes.   
 At the lowest income levels in Japan, most of the total pension benefit comes from 
the basic scheme.  But beyond three-quarters of average earnings, the earnings-related 
pension dominates.  There is, however, a ceiling to earnings-related pensions which caps 
pension benefits for people earning above 170 per cent of the economy-wide average.  The 
progressivity of this two-tier pension system by the individual replacement rates relative to 
pre-retirement pay in the second set of charts.  The flat-rate nature of the basic pension 
means that the total replacement rate declines sharply at first.  The earnings-related 
pension, which pays a flat replacement rate up to a ceiling, offset this effect, until the 
threshold is reached.  After this point, the decline in the replacement rate with pay 
accelerates again.   
 
Figure 1, continued 
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 The picture for the Netherlands is relatively simple: the total pension is simply the 
basic scheme plus an earnings-related top-up.  The integration of the basic and the 
earnings-related scheme means that the earnings-related pension nothing to the 
lowest-income workers.  Unlike most of the 15 countries examined in this paper, there is 
no ceiling either to pension benefits or to pensionable pay under the quasi-mandatory 
occupational plans.  Note that the model assumes that the individual remains in a single 
employer scheme throughout his or her working life.  We will shortly return to the issue of 
pension portability.  
 The Dutch system overall is mildly progressive.  Replacement rates are higher at 
low earnings because of the basic pension.  At higher earnings, the basic and 
earnings-related pension replacement rates are the mirror image of one another, due to the 
integration procedure.  So all workers with pay above half the economy-wide average 
receive a flat 70 per cent replacement rate.   
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Figure 1, contiuned 
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 The mandatory pension scheme in Sweden has four different elements.  The 
earnings-related and defined contribution pensions are proportional up to the contribution 
ceiling.  Hence, the curves in the first chart begin as rays from the origin.  The 
earnings-related pension is much larger than the defined contribution pension, because it 
receives contributions of 16 per cent, compared with 2.5 per cent paid into individual 
pension accounts.  Working in the opposite direction, the model assumes that the rate of 
return credited to the notional accounts (earnings growth) is below the rate of return on 
investments in the funded defined contribution plan.   
Low-income workers receive an income-tested benefit in retirement.  This has two 
different withdrawal rates against income from the public earnings-related pension.  This is 
apparent in the kink in the total pension curve at around half-average earnings.  The 
analysis of the individual replacement rate confirms the strongly progressive role of this 
benefit.  The funded defined contribution and earnings-related pension pay the same 
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replacement rate at earnings up to the ceiling, but the means-tested guarantee pension gives 
a substantial boost to low-income workers’ retirement incomes.   
At higher earnings levels, occupational pensions are the main source of income.  
The chart is based on the ITP scheme, which applies to white-collar workers.  The ceiling 
for this scheme — 5.2 times average earnings — is a little off the horizontal scale.  
However, the switch from a 65-per-cent replacement rate to one of 32.5 per cent at 3.5 
times average earnings is apparent in both charts.   
 Means-tested benefits play a very important role in providing retirement incomes in 
the United Kingdom: 37 per cent of pensioner income units were entitled to means-tested 
support in 1997-98.  However, a full-career worker earning 30 per cent of the 
economy-wide average would just fail to be entitled to the main means-tested benefit, 
known as income support.  The basic pension pays a flat 20 per cent of economy-wide pay 
to workers of all income levels.  The earnings-related pension pays 20 per cent of earnings 
above a floor.  But there is quite a low ceiling to pensionable pay of 1½ times average 
earnings.  Total benefits are therefore flat beyond this ceiling.  The progressivity of this 
system is highlighted by the individual replacement rate in the second set of charts.  The 
basic pension delivers quite high replacement rates to low earners, and the relatively low 
ceiling to pension benefits means that the earnings-related scheme is progressive across 
much of the earnings scale.   
 The public pension scheme in the United States is progressive because of the 
schedule of different replacement rates.  The same effect is achieved by having a multi-tier 
public pension in most of the other countries analysed: Canada, Finland, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom.  Only Germany has a similar progressive 
formula for its public pension. 
Although it is difficult to make out the 90 per cent rate applied to the lowest band 
of earnings (because it is close to the beginning of the curve), the shift from 32 to 15 per 
cent produces a clear kink.  Maximum pensionable earnings are around 2½ times the 
economy-wide average.  The result is a progressive benefit structure, with a monotonic 
decline in the individual replacement rate with earnings.  The ceiling on pensionable pay, as 
elsewhere, also has an important effect.  The social assistance benefit, supplemental 
security income, is set at a level lower than the public pension entitlement of a worker with 
a full career on 30 per cent of average earnings.  However, some states’ additions would be 
payable to lower-earners in these circumstances.  California’s supplement, for example, 
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would boost the total income of pensioners who had earned less than 50 per cent of 
average from around 20 per cent of economy-wide average earnings to nearly 29 per cent.   
 
Figure 2.  Mandatory pension benefits as a proportion of individual 
pre-retirement earnings, 15 countries 
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Table 8 compares the results from the charts of pension benefits (relative to 
economy-wide average earnings) at different levels of pay, given in Figure 1 above.  The 
columns show different proportions of average earnings, ranging from one half to five 
times.   
The paper has already discussed the patterns in each country in detail.  However, it 
is worth now drawing out the different patterns between particular countries.  They divide 
into two broad groups.  The first — consisting of Canada, Germany, Japan, the United 
Kingdom and the United States — has ceilings to pensionable pay and/or to pension 
benefits in the mandatory system.  The second group has either no ceiling — Finland and 
the Netherlands— or a very high ceiling — Sweden and Italy.  At low levels of earnings, 
these countries pay broadly similar levels of benefits to the countries with relatively low 
pension maxima.  But at high levels of earnings, benefits are constant in the first group, but 
continue to grow in the other four countries.   
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Table 8.  Total mandatory pension benefits as a percentage of 
economy-wide average earnings by individual earnings level 
 Individual earnings, proportion of economy-wide average 
 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2 2.5 5 
Australia 35 39 43 51 63 79 157 
Canada 37 40 43 43 36 30 30 
Finland 38 46 60 90 120 150 300 
France 40 54 72 97 108 119 148 
Germany 25 28 38 57 65 65 65 
Italy 36 54 72 109 145 181 264 
Japan 36 44 53 69 75 75 75 
Netherlands 35 53 70 105 140 175 350 
Norway 31 41 52 67 74 74 74 
Spain 44 66 88 132 151 151 151 
Sweden 47 57 69 98 131 163 276 
Switzerland 31 45 58 69 69 69 69 
United Kingdom 25 30 35 44 44 44 44 
United States 29 37 45 58 65 73 73 
 
 
 These ceilings are therefore an important variable in explaining the structure of 
pension benefits in different countries.  They probably deserve more prominence in the 
analysis of countries’ retirement-income systems than they generally receive.  Table 9 
shows maximum pensionable earnings as a proportion of average pay.  It also gives the 
maximum pension benefits that a full-career worker can earn.  All countries have an 
earnings-related pension scheme of some sort, which means that the maximum pension 
benefit is generally earned by high-income workers.  The exception is Canada, because of 
the claw-back of the basic pension from higher-income pensioners.   
 
Table 9.  Maximum pensionable earnings and maximum pension benefits, 
percentage of economy-wide average earnings 
per cent of average earnings Maximum earnings Maximum benefits 
Canada 107 44 
Switzerland 120 69 
United Kingdom 144 44 
Japan 167 75 
Germany 171 65 
Spain 171 151 
Norway 205 74 
United States 250 73 
Italy 365 264 
France 382 148 
Sweden 520 276 
Australia — — 
Finland — — 
Korea — — 
Netherlands — — 
Note: maximum pensionable earnings in the Swedish public scheme are 130 per cent of 
average earnings and maximum pension benefits are 72 per cent of average earnings 
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 Table 10 shows the pension as a replacement rate, relative to individual earnings.  
Table 8, in contrast, showed its level relative to economy-wide average earnings.  Thus, 
Table 10 corresponds with Figure 2, whereas Table 8 corresponds with the results in 
Figure 1.  This Table confirms the pattern of the previous analysis: particularly the 
distinction between countries with relatively low ceilings to pensionable pay and those with 
no maximum or a very high one.  This, as discussed in more detail below, reflects a 
fundamental difference in philosophy between different countries’ mandatory pension 
regimes.  Countries with high ceilings provide comprehensive retirement-income insurance 
through the mandatory system.  They aim to give all workers, including those with high 
incomes, a retirement income that is a high proportion of pre-retirement earnings.  At the 
other end of the spectrum are countries such as Canada and the United Kingdom.  
Although both have an earnings-related scheme, these are on a much smaller scale.  Thus, 
their mandatory regimes are focused more on redistribution: ensuring that all pensioners 
meet a reasonable minimum income standard.  This had led to the development of 
voluntary private provision to perform the insurance role for higher-income workers.   
 
Table 10.  Total mandatory pension benefits as a percentage of individual 
earnings by individual earnings level 
 Individual earnings, proportion of economy-wide average 
 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2 2.5 5 
Australia 71 53 43 34 31 31 31 
Canada 74 54 43 29 18 12 6 
Germany 50 38 38 38 32 26 13 
Finland 77 61 60 60 60 60 60 
France 80 72 72 65 54 48 30 
Italy 58 58 58 58 58 58 42 
Japan 72 59 53 46 38 30 15 
Korea 108 88 78 68 63 60 54 
Netherlands 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Norway 62 55 52 45 37 30 15 
Spain 88 88 88 88 76 61 30 
Sweden 93 77 69 66 65 65 55 
Switzerland 63 61 58 46 34 28 14 
United Kingdom 51 41 35 30 22 18 9 
United States 57 49 45 39 33 29 15 
 
 
 
56 
3. Empirical results: net pension benefits 
 Personal income taxes and social security contributions have an important impact 
on the living standards of older people relative to those of the population as a whole.  This 
section calculates net replacement rates: that is, pension benefits less any income tax and 
social security contributions due relative to net earnings (again, after income tax and social 
security contributions).   
 The details of the calculations of tax liabilities and net incomes for illustrative 
people in work are set out in the OECD’s Taxing Wages report (OECD, 2001).  The 
pensioner tax calculations are described in a companion paper to this one: Keenay and 
Whitehouse (2002a).  
 The overall effective tax rate on people during retirement is usually lower than 
when they were working for three main reasons.  First, tax systems are progressive and 
over most of the income range, the gross replacement rate is less than 100 per cent.  
Secondly, social security contributions are typically levied only on earnings and not on 
pension benefits.  Where pensioners are liable for social security contributions, these are 
usually levied at a lower rate than on people of working age.  Finally, many countries have 
additional concessions to pensioners in their personal income tax.  
 These last two effects are isolated in the companion papers (Keenay and 
Whitehouse, 2002a,b,c), which look at the average effective tax rate paid by workers and 
pensioners at the same income level.  These can be up to 30 percentage points lower for 
older people than they are for people of working age.  The overall impact of the tax system 
— including the effect of the general progressivity of the income tax — can be seen by 
comparing gross and net replacement rates at different levels of income.   
 Figure 3 shows gross and net replacement rates for the 15 countries.  Again, the 
charts show these measures for earnings between 0.3 and five times the economy-wide 
average, capped at 100 per cent.  The gross replacement rate is simply the total pension line 
from Figure 2.  The net replacement rate compares net pension with net earnings.   
 At the earnings of the average production worker, the net replacement rate is 13 
percentage points higher than the gross, averaging across the 15 countries.  Outliers are the 
Netherlands, where the difference is 22 points, and Canada and the United States (16 
points).  At the other end of the spectrum, the difference between net and gross levels in 
Finland (six points), Sweden and Japan (both eight points) are particularly small.  The 
explanation for the differences between countries is complex.  For example, the absolute 
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difference in the Netherlands is large across most of the income range because the Dutch 
quasi-mandatory occupational pensions pay the highest replacement rate among the 15 
countries.  In Canada and the United States, the large difference reflects the value of 
additional tax concessions given to older people.  The small differences in Finland and 
Sweden are because tax concessions are withdrawn from middle- and higher-income 
pensioners.  In Japan, both workers and pensioners face a very low direct tax burden by the 
standards of other OECD countries.   
 
Figure 3.  Gross and net replacement rates 
Mandatory pension benefits as a proportion of individual pre-retirement 
earnings before and after income tax and social security contributions, 
15 countries 
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 Figure 4 shows gross and net pensions as a proportion of economy-wide average 
earnings.  This chart corresponds to the gross results in Figure 1 (while Figure 3 is the 
analogue of Figure 2).  Again, the charts cover the earnings range from 0.3 to five times the 
average.  The charts for countries without ceilings to pension benefits (or a very high 
ceiling) are capped at three times average earnings.  In Figure 3, net replacement rates were 
higher than gross replacement rates for the three reasons set out above.  In Figure 4, the 
grey, dotted lines (the same as the total pension data in Figure 1) show the ratio of gross 
pension entitlement to economy-wide gross average earnings.  The black, solid line shows 
the net pension entitlement divided economy-wide net average earnings.  In the countries 
without ceilings or with high ceilings to pensionable pay, the net pension can fall below the 
gross pension as a proportion of economy-wide average earnings.  This is because the 
average effective tax rate on higher-income pensioners can exceed that paid by the average 
production worker.   
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Figure 4.  Gross and net pension values by earnings 
Mandatory pension benefits as a proportion of economy-wide earnings before 
and after income tax and social security contributions, 15 countries 
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4. Voluntary private pensions 
 Voluntary occupational pension schemes are discussed separately from public and 
statutory quasi-mandatory private schemes because of the complex issues they raise.   
In the absence of detailed data on the benefit formulae of occupational schemes in 
Germany and Japan, this section focuses on Canada, the United Kingdom and the United 
States.  As Tables 11 and 12 show, the proportion of the elderly with income from 
employer-provided pensions is much higher in the three Anglo-Saxon countries than in 
Germany or Japan, even though coverage of the workforce is similar.  (The small 
proportion in Japan receiving an occupational pension income is probably explained by the 
fact that most schemes pay out a lump sum rather than an income stream.  In Germany, 
the explanation is most likely to be the long vesting periods in occupational plans, which 
mean that many people leave covered jobs before establishing a pension entitlement.) 
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Table 11.  Percentage of pensioners with income from employer-provided 
pensions and percentage of workers covered by occupational pension 
plans, late 1990s 
 Percentage of pensioners with 
occupational pension income 
 Percentage of workers covered by 
occupational pension plans 
per cent All Men Women  All Men Women 
Canada 41 54 31  45 52 36 
Germany — 21 9  45 — — 
Japan 10 — —  47 — — 
Netherlands 50 76 23  90 — — 
United Kingdom 49 66 32  47 58 41 
United States 36 48 26  44 48 38 
Source: Johnson (1998), Table 3.1; United Kingdom General Household Survey data; United 
States Department of Labor (1999) 
 
In contrast, occupational pension schemes in Australia and Finland are statutory.  
In the Netherlands and Sweden, they achieve near universal coverage through industrial-
relations agreements at the industry and national level respectively.  Occupational schemes 
in these countries were discussed along with mandatory public pension schemes above.  
Table 12 gives data on the proportion of workers covered by occupational plans for some 
more of the countries surveyed here.38   
 
 
Table 12.  Percentage of workers covered by occupational pension plans 
 Percentage of workers 
Australia 91 
Canada 33 
Finland 100/15 
Germany  46 
Italy 5 
Japan 50 
Netherlands 91 
Norway 50 
Sweden 90 
United Kingdom 46 
United States 45 
Note: statutory plans achieve 100 per cent coverage in Finland; the 15 per cent figure relates 
to additional, voluntary provision by employers 
Source: OECD (2001), Table 6.2; Bateman, Kingston and Piggott (2001); Antolin and Suyker 
(2001) 
 
 
                                                 
38  The data are broadly comparable between the two sources, except for occupational pension 
coverage in Canada.  It has not been possible to determine the reason for the difference. 
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4.1 Modelling occupational pension values 
One difficulty in modelling voluntary occupational schemes is that their terms and 
conditions differ.  Indeed, there are no comprehensive data for Germany and Japan on the 
rules of occupational schemes.  However, in Canada, the United Kingdom and the United 
States, there are regular, detailed surveys of the benefit formula occupational plans.   
Table 13 shows the parameters chosen for the modelling.  These are, where 
possible, ‘typical’ and the approximate proportion of members covered by particular 
provisions are shown in parentheses where available.  More detailed analysis of these 
parameters is provided in the relevant country chapter.   
 
Table 13.  Features of model defined benefit occupational pensions in 
Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States 
 Canada United Kingdom United States 
Earnings measure Final salary (70%) Final salary (95%) Final salary (55%) 
Vesting 5 years’ service 2 years’ service 5 years’ service 
Pension age 65 65 65 (47%) 
Accrual rate 2% a year (70%) 1.25% a year (65%) 1.5% a year 
Integration method 1.3% accrual up to 
public benefit ceiling 
Deduct value of basic 
state pension (12%) 
Lower accrual rate on 
earnings covered by 
public benefit 
Pre-retirement 
indexation 
None Price inflation None 
Post-retirement 
indexation 
Half price inflation Price inflation None 
 
 
 Occupational pensions differ from public-sector schemes in that the benefit 
formula depends on some measure of ‘final’ earnings rather than average pay.  The latter is 
more common in public programmes (at least in OECD countries: Disney and 
Whitehouse, 1999, Tables 1 and 2).  Moreover, public-sector plans with final-salary 
formulae are based on pre-retirement pay, while occupational pension benefits are based 
on the final salary in a particular scheme.  So the benefits of someone leaving a plan at age 
40 — known as an ‘early leaver’ — are based on earnings at that age, not pay immediately 
before retirement.  This, as the following sections show, has important implications for the 
value of pension benefits.   
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4.2 United Kingdom 
 A series of regulatory changes since the mid-1970s have improved the protection of 
pension rights of early leavers.  Since 1990, pension rights that are ‘preserved’ in a scheme 
when an employee moves must be uprated in line with inflation up to a ceiling of 5 per 
cent.  (A preserved pension is when employees retain their rights to an annuity in their 
former employer’s scheme, as opposed to a transfer, when the present value of the pension 
is moved to a new occupational or personal plan.  Return of pension contributions as a 
lump sum was common until this practice was forbidden in the 1970s.)   
If a worker were to spend a full 40-year career in the model scheme, he or she 
would receive a pension of one half (40/80ths) of final, pre-retirement salary.  People who 
spend 20 years in two schemes would get a quarter of final salary from the second scheme 
plus a quarter of their salary in the last year of the first job from the first scheme.  The 
relevant measure of earnings for the first scheme is their real salary, because this must now 
be uprated in line with price inflation (to the five-per-cent ceiling) to retirement.  So if 
people’s real earnings continue to grow in their second job, then the pension from their 
first scheme will be less than a quarter of ‘final’ salary, i.e., their pay immediately before 
retirement.  The degree of loss depends on how fast individual earnings grow.   
 Figure 5 illustrates this effect for a range of different earnings-growth assumptions 
and for a series of equal-length tenures in different plans.  If their real earnings were to 
grow at one per cent, the pension replacement rate falls from one half of final salary for 
people who joined one scheme to 45 per cent for people who spent equal time in two 
plans.  The replacement rate falls with faster increases in earnings: to less than 40 per cent 
with three per cent earnings growth and just one third with six per cent earnings growth.   
 Working across the figure, the more schemes the individual joins, the lower the 
replacement rate at any positive rate of earnings growth.  For example, if someone spent 
eight years each in five different plans, the replacement rate falls to under a third with 
three-per-cent earnings growth and to less than a quarter with six-per-cent earnings 
increases.   
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Figure 5.  Pension replacement rate as a percentage of final salary by 
number of schemes joined and rate of individual earnings growth, 
United Kingdom 
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 The analysis in Figure 5 raises two questions.  First, how often do people move 
between jobs and different pension plans?  Secondly, how fast do individual earnings grow 
over the working life? 
 The United Kingdom government’s view on the first question is that an 
increasingly flexible labour market has led to a more mobile workforce which ‘render[s] the 
traditional occupational pension structure obsolescent or inappropriate for major sections 
of the workforce’.39  The National Association of Pension Funds (a club for mainly large, 
mainly defined benefit occupational schemes) has attacked this view vociferously.  The 
association describes the government’s position as ‘based on flawed analysis and 
interpretation of the scale and nature of changes in employment patterns during the last 
two decades’.40  Average job tenure, according to the association’s study (Meadows, 1999), 
has changed little over the past 20 years: down to five years six months from six years one 
month in 1975.  ‘The idea that in the past many people had a “job for life” with a single 
employer is a myth’, the association said.  This result is confirmed by the Department of 
Social Security’s Retirement Survey, which collected full labour-market histories from 
                                                 
39  Department of Social Security (1998a). 
40  National Association of Pension Funds (1999): see also Timmins (1999b). 
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people aged 55-69 in 1988-89.  These showed that men had eight jobs on average over 
their working life, lasting an average of seven years one month.  Women had slightly over 
five jobs lasting and average of five years two months.41   
 Cross-section studies (for example, Disney and Whitehouse, 1991) of age-earnings 
profiles generally show an inverted-U shape, with real earnings falling at older ages.  The 
pattern varies with occupation.  The pay of professional, and to a lesser extent, managerial 
workers rises steeply with age initially.  Professional earnings flatten when workers reach 
their mid-50s, with an earlier peak for managers.  In contrast, the profiles for manual 
workers are much flatter and peak earlier, in the early to mid-40s.  The decline in earnings 
after their peak is also relatively larger, so that workers from their late 50s onwards earn the 
same or less than workers in their 20s.  However, cross-section analysis conflates age and 
cohort effects.  For example, the pay of 50-year-olds today might tell us something about 
the pay of today’s 40-year-olds when they are 50.  But these cohorts will differ in many 
important attributes that will affect pay: education, training, labour-market experience etc.  
Following the same cohort over time, other studies have found that age-earnings are 
broadly linear, with pay continuing to rise even at older ages.42  These studies suggest a 2-
2½ per cent annual increase for manual workers and five per cent for professionals over 
the working life.   
 Putting these analyses together suggests a high cost to most workers from lack of 
portability of occupational pension benefits.  Average tenure of five-to-six years suggests 
that people would join seven or eight schemes with a career fully covered by occupational 
plans.  Professional workers might expect a replacement rate of around a third and manual 
workers around 45 per cent with that rate of job change.  If the pattern of job tenure is 
broadly similar today as it was 20 years ago, then occupational pensions, which reward 
those with ‘a job for life’, have never been appropriate for the majority of the workforce.  
This result is borne out by the low level of occupational pensions in payment 
compared with earnings.  The average occupational pension in 1997-98 (among the 60 per 
cent of pensioners with some income from this source) was 27 per cent of economy-wide 
average earnings.43  Unfortunately, we do not yet have panel data of sufficient length to 
analyse individual replacement rates.  But this statistic gives a broad indication of average 
replacement rates.  Its low level is indicative in part of the fact that few people spend their 
                                                 
41  See Disney, Meghir and Whitehouse (1994) and Johnson, Disney and Stears (1996).  The retirement 
survey is described in Bone et al. (1992).   
42  See, for example, Meghir and Whitehouse (1996) and Gosling, Machin and Meghir (1998).   
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whole working lives covered by occupational schemes and in part of the cost of lack of 
portability.   
 Figure 6 shows how occupational pensions affect total pension benefits (compare 
Figure 1).  The occupational pension scheme member foregoes his or her entitlement to 
the public earnings-related pension, Serps, but is still entitled to the basic pension.  The 
value of the occupational pension is proportional: the curve is a ray through the origin.  
This curve is also the value of the total pension in the model, integrated scheme, which 
deducts the value of the basic pension from the total benefit.44  Note that the modelling 
assumes that the individual spends eight years each in five different occupational pension 
schemes.  Membership of fewer schemes across the career would result in a higher benefit, 
as Figure 5 illustrates.   
 
Figure 6.  Value of public and private pension benefits in the 
United Kingdom, proportion of economy-wide average earnings 
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The ceiling on pensionable earnings for occupational benefits, set in the United 
Kingdom’s tax law, was £90,600 in 1998-99.  This limit is equivalent to 5.2 times economy-
wide average earnings.  This is off the scale.  So, including occupational pensions, the 
                                                                                                                                               
43  Department of Social Security (2000), Table 12 shows mean receipt of £92 a week.   
44  Some schemes deduct the lower earnings limit for social security contributions, but this, by law, is 
broadly equivalent to the basic pension. 
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pattern of benefit receipt by earnings is similar to other countries with uncapped 
earnings-related pensions: the Finland and the Netherlands.  Indeed, the protection for 
early leavers in the Dutch scheme has many similarities with the United Kingdom’s system.  
However, broad, industry-wide coverage of the Netherlands’ schemes means that the issue 
of pension transfers is probably less significant.   
 
4.3 United States 
 While the United Kingdom has introduced protection for price inflation in its 
occupational pension system both before and after retirement, regulatory attention in the 
United States has focused on the solvency of occupational pension schemes and on vesting 
rights.  Pension benefits are almost entirely unindexed, both after retirement and, for early 
leavers, between the point of leaving a job and the point of retirement.  Early leavers’ 
pensions are, as a result, much lower relative to their level in the United Kingdom.   
 This is illustrated for a model occupational scheme in the United States in Figure 7.  
As in Figure 5, it shows the occupational pension replacement rate for individuals joining a 
different number of occupational schemes of equal tenure throughout their working life.  
(Note that the observations for people joining ten schemes with four years’ tenure each are 
for illustration only: since most schemes have a five year vesting rule, such people would 
receive no occupational pension benefit.)   
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Figure 7.  Pension replacement rate as a percentage of final salary by 
number of schemes joined and rate of individual earnings growth, 
United States 
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 The greater cost of moving jobs can be seen clearly by comparing Figures 5 and 7.  
In the United States model scheme, a full career in an occupational scheme would give a 
replacement rate of 60 per cent.  But joining two schemes for 20 years each would cut this 
replacement rate to 45 per cent, five schemes for eight years each to just 37 per cent.  This 
assumes inflation of 2.5 per cent a year: an episode of higher inflation would erode the 
value of preserved or deferred occupational pension rights more rapidly.  This assumes 
individual real earnings grow at just 1 per cent a year.  With 3 per cent real earnings growth, 
these figures are 40 per cent and 30 per cent respectively.   
 
4.4 Canada 
 Canadian occupational schemes are similarly vulnerable to inflation between the 
point of leaving a particular plan and the time of retirement.  Figure 8 shows the results for 
the model scheme in Canada.  The pattern is the same as in the United States (Figure 7), 
but accrual rates, and so replacement rates, are typically higher in Canada.   
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Figure 8.  Pension replacement rate as a percentage of final salary by 
number of schemes joined and rate of individual earnings growth, 
Canada 
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 Integration of occupational pension benefits is rare in the United Kingdom, but 
very common in both Canada and the United States.  Integration practice in the United 
States varies substantially, so it is difficult to devise a reasonable ‘model’ procedure.  In 
Canada, in contrast, the practice of applying a lower, 1.3 per cent accrual rate to earnings 
below the ceiling for the public, earnings-related benefit is widespread.   
 Figure 9 shows the results of modelling such a scheme.  Even at the lowest 
earnings levels, the retirement income of occupational-scheme members is sufficient to 
float them off the means-tested supplement.  The kink in the schedule for the occupational 
pension value at the ceiling of the earnings-related pension is readily apparent: here the 
pension accrual rate shifts from 1.3 to two per cent of earnings.  As in the United 
Kingdom, the pattern of total pension entitlement, once occupational schemes are taken 
into account, is much closer to Finland and the Netherlands.   
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Figure 9.  Value of public and private pension benefits in Canada, 
proportion of economy-wide average earnings 
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5. Pensions for different family types and additional analyses 
 To simplify the analysis, the calculations in the previous three sections have shown 
the pension benefits for single people with a full career in employment retiring at the 
standard pensionable age.  This section describes how systems treat married couples, 
people with gaps in their work histories and the self-employed.  Ongoing work by the 
OECD’s Economics Department and the Directorate for Education, Employment, Labour 
and Social Affairs is looking at pension benefits for people retiring at different ages.  
Preliminary results from this work were presented in OECD (2001), Annex 2.   
 
5.1 Married couples 
 The pension systems surveyed in this report adopt a number of different 
approaches to benefits for married couples relative to those for single people.  Most 
earnings-related schemes use the individual as the unit of assessment: the same benefit 
formula applies to single people and couples alike.  The one exception to this among the 15 
countries is the United States, where social security pays a 50-per-cent dependants’ 
supplement in respect of spouses with no entitlement of their own (or only a small one).   
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The United Kingdom pays a 60-per-cent dependant’s supplement in its basic 
pension system again to couples where one partner has a smaller entitlement of their own.  
The Netherlands pays a dependant’s supplement of 38 per cent of the principal earner’s 
pension.  The significance of these dependants’ additions has declined due to married 
women’s growing participation in the labour market.  This means that most women already 
earn (or will soon earn) a pension entitlement of their own.  The relation between the age 
pension for single people and couples in Australia is equivalent to a dependant’s addition of 
68 per cent.   
 Canada’s system combines many different elements.  The basic pension is an 
individual entitlement, and the claw-back of the basic pension from higher earners through 
the tax system is again based on individual income.  The means-tested supplement, 
however, uses the couple as the unit of assessment.  The benefit for a couple is 62 per cent 
higher than that for a single person, and the benefit is withdrawn against individual income 
rather than the income of the couple.  The earnings-related pension is assessed individually 
with no extra payments for couples.   
Other resource-tested schemes — such as Australia’s age pension and the United 
Kingdom’s minimum income guarantee — use the couple as the unit of assessment.  
Finland’s basic pension and Sweden’s guarantee pension, however, claw back the benefit 
on an individual basis not on the pension income of the couple.   
 
5.2 Gaps in contribution records 
 There are again many different approaches to the protection of people with gaps in 
their working history, predominantly, of course, women who interrupt their careers to care 
for children or elderly relatives.   
One source of protection is the provision for dependant’s additions (in Australia, 
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States) outlined above.  A couple 
would typically receive extra pension from this source when one partner never worked.  
However, increases in divorce rates and of never-marred lone mothers in many countries 
weaken the degree of protection afforded by dependant’s supplements.  The growth in 
women’s participation in the labour market mean that most of those who remain married 
now spend sufficient time in paid work to earn their own pension entitlement.   
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A second feature of pension systems that helps people with incomplete career 
histories are universal, basic pension schemes that are based solely (or mainly) on a 
residency test.  Examples are Canada’s old-age security and the basic scheme in the 
Netherlands.  Similarly, resource-tested schemes, where they are assessed individually, 
ensure all pensioners receive a minimum income in their own right whatever their work 
record.  Examples include the pension-income-tested schemes in Finland and Sweden.   
In earnings-related schemes, there is a great tension in the goal of protecting people 
with contribution gaps and the insurance aspects of the scheme.  This is particularly 
obvious in the ‘notional accounts’ systems in Italy and Sweden, whose main objective is to 
enhance the ‘actuarial fairness’ of the pension scheme.  However, if benefits are related 
more closely to contributions then the scope for protecting people with low lifetime levels 
of contributions is curtailed.45  Italy relies on its social assistance system to protect low-
income workers, although periods of sickness, maternity, military service and 
unemployment are credited.  Sweden allows for ‘imaginary’ contributions for periods spent 
out of the labour force for periods with caring responsibilities (and unemployment, 
sickness, education etc.).   
 The United Kingdom follows a similar approach in its public, earnings-related 
scheme (Serps).  Under home-responsibilities protection, periods spent out of work caring 
for children under 1646 or for elderly relatives are credited.  So people can earn a full 
entitlement to both the basic pension and Serps with just 20 years of actual contributions.  
Although the United Kingdom’s basic scheme is in theory contributory, the scale of the 
credits for periods not working makes it closer to the universal, residency-tested scheme of, 
for example, Canada.   
Japan allows people to accrue the basic pension at one third of the normal rate 
during specifically exempt periods.  Germany allows for so-called credited periods 
(‘Anrechnungszeiten’) to cover particular episodes of sickness, rehabilitation, 
unemployment, further education, etc.  Since 1992, both parents have been able to claim 
credits for the first three years after the birth of a child should they so choose.   
 Some earnings-related schemes offer some protection to people with broken work 
histories with a progressive formula.  This does not involve a credit for periods spent out 
of the labour force, rather by paying a proportionally higher pension to lower earners it 
                                                 
45  See Disney (1999a,b) for an extensive discussion of the tension between redistribution and actuarial 
fairness.   
46  Or under 18 and still in full-time education. 
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protects, for example, women who work part time for a number of years.  German workers 
earning under half the average can have their pensionable pay increased and the United 
States pays a much higher replacement rate on earnings up to 37 per cent of average.  
Canada and the United States exclude some of the lowest earning years from the lifetime 
average — 15 per cent of the total number of years and five years respectively — which 
has a similar effect.  Canada also excludes periods of low earnings for people raising a child 
under seven from the calculation of average earnings.   
 The remaining earnings-related schemes, however, have no specific provisions for 
contribution gaps.  These are Finland47, Italy (mentioned above) and Japan, plus 
occupational schemes in the Netherlands and Sweden.   
 Quantitative modelling of the effect of these provisions on pension benefits is 
highly sensitive to the precise assumptions about earnings histories, career paths etc.  In 
particular, the effect interacts strongly with the general pattern of pension provision with 
earnings.  For example, the United Kingdom has probably the most comprehensive system 
of credits for periods out of the labour force of the 15 countries studied.  Since its system 
provides relatively low levels of benefits overall, however, the actual benefit level may not 
be much higher than a country with narrower protection for contribution gaps.   
 
5.3 Self-employed 
 The self-employed make up a significant and often growing minority of the 
workforce in many of the countries surveyed.  Table 14 summarises the treatment of the 
self-employed in pension systems.   
 All the countries require the self-employed to participate in at least some 
mandatory pension programmes.  However, in countries with a two-tier pension system, it 
is common for the self-employed to be covered by only the basic tier.  Examples include 
Canada, Japan, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.  Finland, however, operates a 
separate mandatory occupational scheme for the self-employed that delivers the same 
benefits as the schemes for employees.   
 
                                                 
47  Although is an absence from work (e.g. for maternity leave) lasts less than one year than the worker 
will be covered.   
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Table 14.  Pension systems and the self-employed 
Country Coverage of self-employed 
Australia Means-tested scheme only 
Incentives for voluntary private provision 
Canada Basic scheme only 
Not in earnings-related schemes (CPP/QPP) 
Finland Basic scheme 
Separate occupational plan (YEL/MYEL) 
Germany State scheme 
Italy State scheme 
Japan Basic scheme only 
Netherlands Basic scheme only 
Sweden Whole mandatory system 
United Kingdom Basic scheme only 
Not required to have second pensions (Serps, personal or 
occupational plans) 
United States State scheme 
 
 
 
5.4 Post-retirement indexation of pension benefits 
 The results so far have presented pension values at retirement, but ignored the 
issue of the uprating of pension benefits after retirement.  Indexation procedures, as this 
section shows, have an important effect on the lifetime value of pension benefits.   
 Table 15 summarises the post-retirement uprating procedures (based on the 
country chapters), ranked by the generosity from the least favourable at the top to the most 
favourable at the bottom.  Private pensions in the United States are rarely changed once in 
payment.  Automatic uprating is also rare in Canada, but the average of ad-hoc and 
automatic increases has, in the past, been roughly a rise of half of price inflation.  Price 
uprating is common, particularly in public schemes, but the United Kingdom also requires 
its private pensions to index benefits (up to a ceiling).  Sweden and Finland have complex 
formulae.  Both grant real increases when real earnings are growing, in Sweden if pay 
growth exceeds a norm and in Finland simply if real wage growth is positive.  Germany and 
the Netherlands index pensions in payment to net pay: the net minimum wage in the latter 
case and net earnings of pension contributors in the former.  Finally, Italy increases 
pensions in line with a moving average of GDP growth.   
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Table 15.  Post-retirement indexation procedures in 
different pension systems 
Uprating procedure Country and scheme 
No indexation United States: occupational schemes 
Half prices Canada: occupational schemes 
Prices Canada: public schemes 
Finland: basic public pension 
Japan: public schemes 
Sweden: means-tested pension 
United Kingdom: public and occupational schemes 
United States: public scheme 
Gross earnings less 1.6% Sweden: earnings-related scheme 
Gross earnings 20%, prices 80% Finland: earnings-related scheme 
Net minimum wage Netherlands: basic public pension 
Net earnings Germany: public scheme 
Gross earnings Australia: public scheme 
GDP growth Italy: public scheme 
 
 
 The difference between these indexation procedures in a single year is small, but 
over time, the differences compound.  Pensions can, of course, be paid for many years or 
even decades.  Figure 10 shows the effect on the pension value over time of different 
indexation procedures from age 65.  The Figure assumes that real earnings and real GDP 
grow by two per cent a year, and that price inflation is two per cent.  The increase in 
contribution rates to finance the growing demographic burden on pension systems is 
assumed to reduce net wage growth below gross wages, to 1½ per cent a year.  In 
Germany, for example, the contribution rate for pensions was projected to increase from 
19.3 per cent in 1995, to nearly 30 per cent in 2030.48  The Figure is normalised around 
price indexation, which keeps the real purchasing power of the pension constant.   
 
                                                 
48  Börsch-Supan (1998).  This is equivalent to a 0.3-0.4 per cent difference between net and gross 
earnings.   
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Figure 10.  Effect of different post-retirement indexation procedures 
on pension values in payment 
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 By age 80, the absence of indexation cuts the real pension value by more than 30 
per cent, even at the relatively low level of 2½ per cent inflation.  Semi-price indexation, 
the average in Canadian private pensions, would cut the pension value by 17 per cent over 
the 15 years from age 65 to 80.  The formulae in Sweden and Finland give very similar 
results under these assumptions.  At age 80, the pension is six per cent higher in real terms.  
Net earnings indexation would give a much larger rise — 25 per cent — while full 
indexation to earnings or GDP growth would increase pensions by 30 per cent over 15 
years.   
 Using a mortality table, it is possible to calculate the effect on the lifetime present 
value of the stream of pension benefits uprated in different ways.  The results of this 
exercise are shown in Table 16.  With price indexation, the annuity factor at age 65 is 13.1.  
This means that a pension benefit of $1,000 a year would have a present value of $13,100.  
The absence of indexation cuts the real present value of a pension stream by 17.7 per cent.  
Indexation to GDP growth, giving a 2-per-cent-a-year increase, means the pension stream 
is worth an extra 19.2 per cent.   
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Table 16.  Net present value of pension under different 
indexation procedures 
Uprating procedure Annuity factor Relative to price 
indexation 
No indexation 10.7 -17.7% 
Half prices 11.8 -9.6% 
Prices 13.1 0% 
Gross earnings less 1.6% 13.5 3.4% 
Net minimum wage 13.5 3.5% 
Net earnings 14.9 13.9% 
GDP growth 15.6 19.2% 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 This paper has calculated prospective pension entitlements for illustrative workers 
in 15 countries retirement-income systems.  It has looked at both public and private 
schemes and at the effect of the direct tax system (personal income tax and social security 
contributions).  The main focus has been on the treatment of workers at different income 
levels, but it has also looked briefly at different family types and workers with different 
career patterns.  Ongoing work, involving the author and the OECD Secretariat, is 
extending the analysis to look at the position of people retiring at ages other than the 
standard pensionable age.   
 The most striking finding is the pattern of statutory pension values for people with 
different earnings levels.  This result is summarised in Figure 11.  The charts look at 
full-career workers earning various proportions of the economy-wide average: half, average, 
one-and-a-half times and twice mean pay.  The vertical axis shows the corresponding 
individual pension value as a percentage of economy-wide average earnings.  In Italy, the 
public pension scheme has a high ceiling.  It is designed to achieve a great degree of 
earnings replacement, even for high-income workers.  A similar effect is achieved by the 
statutory occupational pension system in Finland and the quasi-mandatory occupational 
schemes in the Netherlands and Sweden.  The Dutch and Finnish systems have no ceiling 
to benefits; in Sweden, the ceiling is very high.  Korea’s severance pay scheme also has no 
ceiling.  In these countries, there is some additional protection for low-income workers, but 
over much of the income range, projected pension values are linear.   
At the other end of the spectrum, the philosophy of the Canadian and British 
systems is very different.  These systems are more redistributive.  They ensure that all 
pensioners achieve a basic standard of living rather than aiming to give everyone a certain 
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level of earnings replacement.  This has led to development of extensive voluntary private 
coverage, particularly among higher-income workers.  Both countries have mandatory 
earnings-related public schemes, but these have low ceilings and relatively low accrual rates.   
 France and Spain look similar to the first group of countries.  Their pension 
systems are focused on an insurance objective, but ceilings are lower  
 
Figure 11.  Pension values as a proportion of economy-wide earnings for 
workers earning between one half and twice average 
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 It is interesting to contrast these results with analyses of income-distribution data.  
OECD (2001) and Disney and Whitehouse (2001) find that the OECD countries achieve 
very similar outcomes in terms of the incomes of older people relative to people of 
working age.  In countries that do not provide comprehensive earnings replacement for 
higher-income workers, such people make voluntary provision, either through occupational 
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or personal pensions or other forms of saving.  This substitution of different forms of 
retirement-income provision is, of course, widely recognised in the pension literature.49   
 The second key finding of this paper is the impact of the direct-tax system on the 
living standards of the elderly.  This is both because of the general progressivity of the 
income tax and because pensioners often receive favourable treatment under the income 
tax and social security contribution regime.  Net replacement rates — pensions after tax as 
a proportion of net earnings — are typically 10-15 percentage points higher than gross.  
The tax advantage makes up almost a third of the net replacement rate for someone 
earning the economy-wide average.  It is therefore important that policy-makers do not 
consider the structure of pension benefits in isolation from the direct-tax position of older 
people.50   
 It is difficult to compare countries’ pension systems by looking at their parameters 
alone.  This paper has shown that the pattern of statutory pension entitlements varies 
enormously between the 15 countries.   
 
                                                 
49  See, for example, Börsch-Supan (1998) and Disney, Mira d’Ercole and Scherer (1998).   
50  See Keenay and Whitehouse (2001 and forthcoming) for a more detailed analysis of the tax position 
of older people.   
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